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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the changing positions
-of the Louisville Courier-Journal concerning American government policy and action in Vietnam from 1954 to 1969, and to
identify the principal factors which underlay changes in . the
paper's viewpoint.

Similarly this paper attempts to show

the relation b~tween such shifts and changes within the
Courier-Journal staff and management, variations in the
government policy, or alterations in the military and
political situation in Vietnam.

Courier-Journal opinion is

thus correlated with Vietnam-related events and American
foreign policy.

In determining Courier-Journal editorial

policy both staff-written and syndicated editorials are
considered.

In addition, editorial cartoons are taken into

account-.
For ~onvenience, the period under study is divided
into 'five peri~ds.

The first chapter includes 1954 and 1955

when the Courier-Journal advocated· intervention in Indochina
and presented syndicated columnists who voiced similar
sentiments.

C_hapter two deals with 1956 to 1960 when few

edi toriai's commented on Vietnam and the American commitment
there was indefinite.

In the third chapter, an analysis of

"'· begins to shift to a more
the Kennedy years, the paper
:t-

pacifistic attitude and ceases supporting the war.

The

Johnson Administration manifests a new editorial policy
advocating negotiation and criticism of the war.

Chapter

four studies this shift and Courier-Journal opposition in
1965 to Johnson's war policy.

Chapter five details the

further development of this policy in the period 1966-1969.
The final chapter is a summary of the entire period.
It is not the purpose of this paper to chronicle the
history of the Vietnam conflict or to consider the reaction
of the Courier-Journal to its entire course.

Rather, this

paper concerns itself exclusively with the period 1954-1969
and ends with the termination of the Johnson Administration.
This paper begins near the end of French Colonial rule
in Indo-China.

This colonial administration which began

in

the 1850's and continued uninterrupted to 1940 became the
victim of the surge of post World War II nationalism which
swept non-western countries.

Its · chief antagonist was a

Vietnamese Communist and Nationalist Ho Chi Minh whose
dedicated mobile forces had been harassing Frerich re-establishment of colonial rule since the Japanese defeat of 1945.
During World War I I Ho had been considered primarily a useful
nationalist and had received United States aid in his efforts
against the Japanese.

In the postwar years more emphasis

had been put on his Corrmunist affiliations and American aid
had gone to his French enemies.

After years of constantly

increasing attritional warfare the French Union Forces in
1954 were dealt a stunning defeat . by .the Viet-Minh at Dien
Bien Phu.

This defeat coupled with the general disgust of

the war weary French led them to seek a negotiated settlement.

Thus at the beginning of the period covered by t;his
'

paper, the French situation in Indo-Chin~ .was desperatJ.
The Vie·t-Minh held the upper hand and world ~ttention ·

1

focused on the outcome of upcoming peace talks.

.I
i

i'

CHAPTER I
A PRO~INVOLVEMENT STANCE, 1954-1955

•
11 veIn 1954 t h e Courier- J ourna 1 f avore d American invo

ment in Southeast Asia.

During that ?nd the-following year,

the paper advocated commitment of American funds and supplies
to Indo-China and supported the use of airstrikes to aid
the beleaguered French at Dien Bien Phu.
_. -The paper assumed _this stance largely because the
attitude. of its editorial staff was clearly internationalist,
a policy dating back to at least the 1940 1 s·.

The Courier-

Journal had supported Franklin D. Roosevelt's internationalist policies, praised the establishment of the United
Nations,- and agreed with President Harry Truman's cold.war
policy of keeping American forces abroad.

The publisher of

the.Courier-Journal at the time was Mark F. Ethridge,
.

a'

Nqrth .c_aroliria newspaperman, strongly anti-Communist and
po.lie i tally_ conservative.

The editor was the somewhat :more

liberal internationalist, Barry Bingham.

Among the staff

writer 9 of 1954 and 1955 were editorial-page editor Russel
B~iney, Adele.Brandeis, Molly Clowes, Tarleton·collier,
·weldon James, Grover Page and John Ed Pearce.

No change

occurred in the make-lip of. _this staff until the departure
of Tarleton Collier in 1958.

i

Essentially the staff waS

1

2
conservative and ready to support a major effort to stem
the tide of Communism in Southeast Asia.

Among its members

English-born Molly Clowes, who joined the paper in 1947,
would become the most vehement critic of Vietnam policy.
Veteran editor Russel Briney as well as writers John Ed
Pearce (in the beginning) and Weldon James were extremely
pro-war .

James, in 1954 recently out of the M~rine Corps

with a good memory of Korea, fully supported the Vietnam
conflict and United States intervention, during his tenure
on the paper.

Indeed the paper's changing view of the war

prompted hi s eventual resignation.

With few exceptions the

paper's editorials were unsigned and products of composite
views.

Thus there existed a problem in determining which

members of the staff were most influential at any specific
time.

The balance in 1954 and 1955, one may conclude from

the paper's editorial policy, favored the war supporters,
the anti-Communi st tough liners .
The Courier-Journal advocated a forceful American antiCommunist policy in relation -to Indo-China.

In line with this

positi on the paper prai sed a John Foster Dulles speech of
early April, 1954, which a dvocated str ong American commit~
ments to Indo-China.

The paper lauded the Secretary of State

for squarely facing the facts and giving the Communists no
hint of weakness.

Indeed, the paper felt, "the Dulles

speech has cut the ground f r om under the growing group of
appeasers, in Pari s, " 1 By this term the paper meant the
1 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 6, 1954.
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French government, which it felt was giving in unnecessarily
to the. Communist demands in its efforts to achieve a peaceful
solution to the conflict in Inda-China •. The "facts" the

,

I

paper felt, were that a concession to the Communist in Indal
China could only lead to further demands elsewhere. As an
· example, the paper cited the Kunich Conference of 1938.
Instead the United States and the French should stand fast
against all Communist demands.

The paper was following the

tide of public opinion.· Neither the Courier-Journal nor
American public opinion would approve concessions to
Communism in 1954.
In 1954 and 1955,. the Courier-Journal advocated American
involvement in the Inda-China War.
the French effort at Dien Bien Phu.

Its editorials supported
Indeed, it condoned

heavy United States financial aid to the French in their
effort.

When on February 11, 1954, the United States ~ir

. Force sent two hundre·d technicians to Inda-China as a part
of the American aid program, the Courier-Journal praised the'
action.

The·paper rationalized it as possibly prevent;ing the

sending of more troops later, perhaps in a combat cap8;city.
Although·the paper did not advocate use of American combat
units, it certainly approved of any effort to provide the
.French with non-combat technicians in small numbers and
spare parts, obsolete aircraft as well as maintainence:
. equipment.

Without such American effort, Inda-China m,ight

fall to the Viet-Minh? thus opening the way to the ultimate
. f

fall of all Asia to Communism.

This fear of a chain-

4

reaction fall of many nations to Communism was called ~he
rtdomino-theoryrt and was prominent in American thinking of the
early fifties.

It not only found popularity among editorial

f

writers. of the time but also helped form the basis of · he
Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy.

Thus Indo,-

China took on more than its intrinsic importance.

It was
I

vi.ewed as a vital domino in the chain, one which could fall
to Communism and start a chain-reaction in Asia or might
s·tand firm against the tide of "Communist aggression,"
serving as a formidable dike against. the red tide of
Communism.
_. . What the Courier-Jou·rnal failed to take into account
was the role..of the Vietnamese people in this issue.

It

simply ignored the rising nationalism of the Vietnamese as
it.ignored the fact that the French role was not primarily
that of an anti-Communist force, but rather that of a
colonial. power.

'I .

Furthermore ·the paper, in 1954 at least,

viewed Communism as a monolthic force, controlled and operated from·Moscow.

In doing so, it committed itself to' oppose

Ho Ch:j. Minh simply because he was a Communist and to ignore
his rote as le·ader of Vietnamese: nationalists •
•

· ·However, soon after this April 6 editorial the paper
carried the· counter-opinion of .Drew Pearson, the national
c<;>lumnis.t:, · who saw war in Indo-China as an embarrassin~
dilemma, a quagm~re which the United States. should avoid. 2

2rbid.,

April 8, 1954.

5

While the Courier-Journal strongly advocated American
involvement in Indo-China, the paper also on rare occasions
presented columnists .of differing views.

I

In 1954 Pears on 1 s

comment of April 8 was the only such editorial presente,d.
1

'

Perhaps the paper was simply attempting to appear unbiased
'I

in presenting both sides of a controversial issue.

I

Mo:r,e

likely however, the paper's staff entertained some small
doubts about the advisibility of full intervention in IndoChina.

While lacking the necessary concensus of opinion to

compose a staff editorial on the subject, perhaps the

·

paper expressed this doubt-by printing the Pearson comment,
Obviously by early April the staff position had somewhat solidified.

At that time Admiral Arthur W. Radford,

Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a United States carrierbased air-strike against the Viet-Minh positions around
Dien Bien Phu, a strike designed to show United States;
determination to deter Communist aggression through air
power, thus avoiding a land war in Asia •. The Couri.er-

·

Journal supported this plan and contended that if inter,.
vention could be confined to such airstrikes, that· was the
thing to do. 3 .· The paper saw air power ~s· a
·deal with the problem.-

11

clean11 way t9

Through the effective use of its·

carrier-based air forces, the United States could assist the
French and yet avoid the intricacies and possible· long· term
commi.tments of an Asian land war.

The paper ·would· co~-

tinuously voice its distaste for .lan9 wars in Asia,

3 rbid., April 11, 1954.

J
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By mid-April the tone of Couri er-Journal editorials
had become more moderate, expressing hope for the upcoming
Geneva Conference and peace.

This conference on the future

Indo-China included co-chairmen from the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union as well as representatives of Comnunist
China, France and the states of Indo-China.

The United

States also sent as its representative Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles.

The paper felt that the conference

should be gi ven every pos sible chance of success.

It con-

tended "time and the rainy s eason, for once, justify the
free world in delaying the issuance of ultimatums almost
certain to guarantee the f ailure of the conference." 4

The

appeal was for moderation in hope of a negotiated settlement
for the time being but there was no call for abandonment of
the French e f fort in Indo-China.

The paper remained

unconvinced, though hopeful, about the chances for a real
and lasting negotiated settlement.

The staff felt that:

It is the conviction of all informe d observers
that a truce in Indochi na would dissolve the c ountry
into Communi sm in a ma t ter of weeks . I t i s more than
possible t hat the e nd r e ult would be Communism over
all the Asian continent. 5
At thi s point the staff opinion appeared to falter.
equivocated on the point of a negotiated peace.

It

On the one

hand it supported such a move a s the speediest, leas t costly
way out of the Indo-Chi na si tuation.
4 rbid., April 15, 1954.
5rbid., April 18 , 1954.

On the other hand it

7

feared·the outcome of negot:i,at;i.ons would favor the Communists.
Obviously, such a result would be unacceptable.

Thus the

paper was left in an ambiguous position;
Despite this seeming contrad:ict:ion the Courier-Journal.
clung to the view that Communist domination of al! Asila would
result from a French defeat in Indo-China and that a
negotiated s·ettlement would be better than a French defeat or
withdrawal.

As earlier in 1954, this.attitude probably

reflected the general tone of public sentiment toward
Com.rnunism.

These were the days of Senator Joseph McCarthy

and the second

11

Red Scare."

The fall of China to Communism,

the demise of a free Eastern Europe and -the Korean War contributed to anti-Communist fears.

Therefore, the paper'hoped

for more than a mere truce at Geneva.

Rather it demanded

finnness in negotiations in hopes of a pro-Western settlement.
In line with its policy of supporting American aid to
I

the Fren'ch in Indo-China, the paper ~commended an Ameri~an
airlift of French troops to Indo-China.

Indeed, an editorial

maintained:
·• .. ,· • on the balance it seems clear that Dulles's
· bold decision--to let Peking and Moscow know that
th{s country· will fight rather than let Indochina
go down the drain--has a ready greatly strengthened
the posture of the West.
._
-

6

Such a·strong stand, the- paper held, raised t~e hope that the
Geneva _Conference.might be more than -a mere sellout,

6rbid,, April 22, 19'.54.
1954 (p-:-I"""this paper).

cf. Ibid., February 11,

J

'

8

The syndicated columnists in the Courier-Journal
displayed.nearly identical opinions about the conference at
Geneva and voiced fear of a settlement favorable to th~
'
David Lawrence praised early American action
at
I
Geneva as, "skillful, resolute, tactful, firm.n 7 He

Communists.

1

seemingly believed that any settlement which was in thJ
-

smallest degree favorable to-the Communists constituted a
sellout.

But the anti-Communists viewpoint was not as

universal as the paper's editorials indicated.

Both the

British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden and former Prime
Minister Winston Churchill-, argued against a strict hardtine course maintaining ·that Geneva offered, "hope of a
genuine effort at an. international detente." 8 Dulles would
have none of it and the paper supported his position.
The editorial of May 1, 1"954.left no doubts.that the
.'
Courier-Journal advocated a strong anti-Communist position.
'
.
•·:

On that day, an editorial and cartoon prai_i;;ed Dulles 1 ~peningspeech at Geneva in which he pressed fo"r _decisive anti_;
Communist action.

Dulles sought united a~tion with FrJnce,
•

•

•

•

+

the United Kingdom and the United States cooperating intl).e defense of. Southeast Asia against Co"llllllUnist aggre~sio·n
implying the possible use of American ground troops in such
"united action."

The paper concluded that:

7~
b. . , April 30, 1954.

8 David Horo.witz, The Free Wo.rld Colossus (New YoJk:
Hill and Wang, 1965), p. 150.

9

Sooner or later the free governments must assert
. their readiness to make sacrifices for collective action
in Southeast Asia, or else see that area conquered by
the Communists. A strong American stand at Geneva,
he (Dulles) said, was the only hoije f.or the salvation ·
of Southeast Asia from Communism.
·
:.
'

.

This stand
would
include the threat of united milita-rv!action
.
.
- J I
against the Communists. On the opinion page, David Lawrence
,

I

also praised Dulles claiming, "Dulles presented the facts of
international life to the assembled delegates in a speech
that will live long in the history of free men.n 10 Lawrence
further praised Dulles for branding North Korea and Communist
I

China aggressors and urging un:Lted action against them by the
free world.
May 8 ·the Courier-Journal staff saw a more pressing

reason for American involvement, or at least continued
support of the 'French:
If the French pulled out now and left a power
vacuum, however, there could be but one result:
the Communists would take over the country and
give it to China.11 ·
Syndicated columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop agreed
with this judgment.

Both the Courier..:Journal and .its :

syndicated writers, the Alsops and Lawrence, expressed
doubt as·to the effectiveness of any negotiated settlement
and came to liken the agreement which finally evolved from·
· Geneva to an 11Asian Munich. 11 12

9The Courier-Journal (Louisville), May 1, 1954.
lOrbid.
11rbid., May 8, 1954.
12
rb·d
May 17, 1954.
·__!_·'

.I
I

'

10
This agreement prov:i.ded for division of Indo-China
into four parts:

Communist North Vietnam, pro-western

South Vietnam and the two neutral states.of Cambodia and
Reunification elections for the two Vietnams were to

Laos.

be held in 1956.

I
The French presence in Indo-China would be
I

At this time those Vietnamese who desiredI'
to· leave the·Communist controlled region would be allowed

. quickly ended.

to move to the ·south.

Though its rep!esentative, Secretary

of State John Foster Dulles attended the conf.erence, the
United States did not sign the final document.
A lack of faith in the results at Geneva led the
Courier-Journal to ask whether American intervention would
have been better and to answer in the affirmative.

In

advocating intervention, however, the Couri'er-Journal was
ready to draw the line at the use of atomic weapons, a
poli_cy held during the entire course of the Southeast tsian
conflict.

The -paper _might approve Admiral Radford I s proposal

for a massive conventional airstrike, but it could never
condone the use of atomic weapons in'Indo-China.

The paper's

reply·to Senator Styles Bridges' proposal of such actibn was
u~equ\voc~l-. - "We must not use such weapons willy-nilly in
hqpe of

~n ._'easy'. solution

for_ a problem that is embarrassing
tc;> American politicians _in an election year. 1113 The Courier-

Journal was not alone in holding this view.

Extensive

opp.osi tion in the Eisenhower Administration, the Joint Chiefs
1

...
13rbid., June 8, 1954.

11 .
.

'

of Staff and Congress made such use only a remote possi·bility.
The Courier-Journal was not encouraged by the reshlts
;
of the Geneva Conference.

It felt the conference was merely

a capitulation to Communist designs in Southeast Asia. I As
a ·result of Geneva it maintained:
• • • we find our side sadly on the defensive. Wh'ile
the Communists hawk circles ominously in the sky oyer
Indochina, the Western nations run around like chickens
clucking and pecking at each other.. • • • The hard lesson
of Geneva is not despair, but the desperate need for
united action which will involve the Asian nations.14
This call for intervention was rationalized by'citing the
grave danger of vacillation on the part of the United States.
nif the President and Kr. Dulles are correct as to the
result of ·a Communis·t victory in Indo-China, then we are on_ly
guaranteeing that we shall have a tremendous war (by waiting).n 15
The Courier-Journal fully agreed with this Eisenhower-Dulles
evaluation of the Indo-China situation and in.its edit6rial
policy supporte~ their views.

Both the p~per and the

Eisenhower Administration believed
that re'.sistance- in Indo..
China was essential in the containment of C?mmuni·sm,. They
both viewed. Inda-China as the· first in a chain of i!dominoes;tt
W~en the Geneva pact was signed, the Courier.:.Jouril~l
·and its syndicated writers denounced the agreement.

The

paper viewed the.division of the territory aii unfair •. It
held that provisions for enforcement of the treaty were
14rbid., June 10, 1954.
15rbid., June 13, 1954.
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unrealistic and for the reunification of Vietnam inoperable.
As such, the treaty was little more than a legal sellout.
In addition to comments by the Courier-Journal staff, ~oseph
and Stewart Alsop claimed that the Geneva pac.t was "a dis-

I

aster from which the American government cannot possibly
'
disassociate itself." 16 The Courier-Journal staff exp1;essed
nruch the same sentiments, holding the treaty in as nruch
contempt as the Munich accords of 1938.
In November and December of 1954, United States 4rmy
General J. Lawton Collins conducted a military advisory and
evaluation mission to Vietnam and concluded that South;
Vietnam was far too unstable to survive unaided.

He felt

.that the nation's new Premier Ngo Dinll Diem was unequal to
the task of solidifying South Vietnam and should be removed.
Subsequently, the Courier-Journal in an evaluation of this
mission agreed that the situation was critical and helq that
I

.the odds were ten-to-one in Indo-China against the survival
.o~ a pro-Western state.

Such odds existed, the paper con-

cluded, largely because of the terms of. the Geneva·pac~.
Thi.s pact gave to the Comnrunists North Vietnam, left the door
open to subversion by the neutralization of Cambodia and Laos
and outflanked South Vietnam.

Furthermore, the paper argued,

the. treaty provided for the reunification of Vietnam by
elections which, if carried out, would allow the Communist
North to swallow the free South.
-,

16rbid., July 24, 1954.

The Courier-Journal Jas

13

not alone in thinking thai a national election would eiiminate.a free South Vietnam.

Senator JohnF. Kennedy argued

that:
'

I

• • • ·despite any wishful thinking to the contrary;
. · • it should be apparent that the popularity and pre- I
valence of Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout
Indochina would cause either partition or a coalition
government to result in eventual domination by the;
Communist, 17
!
· In evaluating the situation as reported by Gener~l
Collins, Courier-Journal syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop
saw little reason for hope.

He contended that the United
'

'
States should,. prepare (for) an even larger disaster in
11

Asia, 11 because even South Vietnam was rife with CommuJsm. 18

He ·further argued that in the South the real power lay with
the Communist controlled Viet-Minh and since the reunification
elections were so near, there would be no opportunity to
replace the southern leadership with a democratic governm~nt
capable of surviving the elections.

Thus there remained

little hope for the continued existence of a non-Communist
South Vietnam •. At the close of 1954, nothing published on
the Courier-Journal editorial page offered much hope for the
s~rvival
. of a·non-Communist Indo-China, . Clearly the paper
•
on.September 10 and especially after Nove~ber 14, 1954'felt
that withbut a strong leader capable of uniting the South,
all Vietnam would soon fall to the Communists.

17Jt>hn F •. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (London:
Hamil ton, 1960), p. 88. '-·
:
I
18 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), December 19, :1954.

In 1955, the Courier-Journal's hope for the existence
of a non-Communist portion of Indo-China grew even dimmer.
The Saigon government, already unpopular with the paper
because of its weakness and corruption, became, in its·
eyes, even more discredited.

I

The paper saw in the Diem

I

regime excesses in the exercise of police power, failure to
.

I

,

I

properly employ armed forces and favoritism toward th~ land-.
1

holding few of the Catholic ruling class.

Botn the Courier-

Journal staff and Joseph Alsop saw the .weakness of the'
government in South Vietnam as the· beginning of a chainreaction loss of Asia.

Alsop called this Saigon government,

"nothing as yet but an obscene basket of eels. n

To him it

seemed weak and ineffective.

Still, he felt, there was hope.
because, "Ngo Dinh Diem (is] honest and virtuous •• • • nl9
Such a weakness of government could lead, however, to the
fall of Vietnam, Alsop contended.

In his eyes, such a

disaster as the fall of Southeast Asia to the Communists
could, "determine·the future • • • of the.whole trend of·
hist~ry in our times.n 20
The Courier-Journal agreed.· Like ~lsop, th¢ staff saw·
the demise of South Vietnam as an imminent possibility and
with similar c·onsequences.

nrf the Communists could gain•

mastery over this mass of humanity, the day of Western
freedom would come to a blood-red suriset.n 21
. 19rbid., January 1, 1955. Diem was the· Presi·dent of
the Republic of South Vietnam, 1955-63; Premier 1954~55.
! .

20rbid., January 13, 1955.
2lrbid., January 1, 1955.

Few sourc.es exhibited much £ai th in Diem or his·
methods for re-uniting Vietnam.

In a 1955 report Senator

Mike Mansfield saw the instability of South Vietnam as
"unbelievably grave" and maintained, "almost the only _thread
that linked the multiplicity of £orces in Vietnam is their
general agreement that Ngo Dinh Diem must go.~ 22 The\
i
formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (~EATO
begun September 8, 1954 but not in operation until 1955)
.

'

did little to east the fears of the Courier-Journal that
South Vietnam would soon· fall to the Communists.

This

defense pact designed to be an Asian NATO, the staff
.
.

believed, fell quite shor~ of that mark.

A sta£f-wri t!,ten

editorial stated that, "at this point we wouldn 1 t give a
Confederate dollar for the success of that great S. E. A.
T. O.tt23
By April, Alsop was ready to write off Diem and
Vietnam with one stroke of the pen, claiming rtthe Diemi
-experiment·[i.e. the attempt to establish Diem as the
· effective leader of.South Vietnam and·to make him capable
of a strong showing in the reunification electionsj has
failed. 11 24 So_mehow Diem had fallen short of gaining
popularity and real support in South Vietnam.

What he

needed to do, the paper contended, was to institute real
22Horowitz·, Ql2.• £it., p. 152.
23The Courier-Journal (Louisville), February 23, il955.
24rbid., April 5, 1955.

·,

....

16
land refonn and enforce social legislation aimed at raising
the literacy and sanitation of the people, and especially
their standard of living.
what Diem refused to do.

This unfortunately
was exactly
.
I
His refusal particularly tol carry

out necessary land refonns cost him the support of
hi~'
.
people and of certain elements of American public opinion,
I

The Courier-Journal along with other ·papers became disenchanted with Diem's lack of progress. 25 At the same time
the Courier-Journal staff felt, "it is obvious that we and
the French need a fresh start in Vietnam as soon as possi.ble. tt 26 Thus· the Courier-Journal, its syndicated columnists,
and-other press opinion seemed to agree that the United States
_should disengage itself from support of Diem but not from
support of an anti-Communist South Vietnam.· None of these
sources, however, indicated who should replace Diem.
Diem may well have failed to gain the necessary
. I

popularity and_ support needed to build a strong democratic
Vietnam, but there was no reason to believe that other
25 David Hotham quoted in Vietnam The First Five
Years~·Lindholm ed., Praeger: New York, 1959, p. 346. The
Londori_Times held that instead of, uniting it, Diem has·
divid~d the South. Instead of merely crushing_his legitimate enemies, the Communists, he has crushed all opposition
of every.kind, however anti-Communist. it might be. In
doing so he has destroyed the very basis on whichhi.s regime
should be founded. He has been able to do this, simply and
solely be.cause of the massive dollar aid he ha"s had from
acro_ss. the Pacific, which kept in power a man who, by !111
laws of human an9 political affairs, would long ago have
fallen. ·niem' s main supporters are to be found in NorJ;h
America; not in Free Viet,!)am.
i
26The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 16, 1915.
I

17
stronger leaders might not succeed.

The Courier-Journal

agreed with the idea espoused by Joseph Alsop.

"Unless the

Communist advance in Southeast Asia can somehow be halted, we
are probably due to wake up one day to the unpleasant ~iscovery that Tokyo depends on Saigon. 1127 Once. more the
J

'

.

domino theory came into play.

'

If Indo-China fell to the

I

Red forces, he believe~ that Japan would be th~eatened:with
I

Communist aggression and possibly all-Asia would be _lo~t to
the free world.

The Courier-Journal agreed.

Both .the paper

and its syndicated writers in 1955 ·saw Vietnam_as a danger
spot in the containment of Communism, arguing that it was
.imperative that the danger of a Communist take over be met,
Having·established the fact that the Communist challenge in
Indo-China had to be met, the paper debated the probable
methods of meeting it.

Effect:i,. ve ac.tion py the local .

government was the most desirable alternative, but the Diem
i

government appeared -incapable of accomplsihing the task.
Economic aid and technical military assistance seemed to
offer the most practical solution.

As• it had in Europe,

through the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, the United_
.

.

States could supply the hardware, techrii_cal know-how and.
funds.

·The Diem government could·. provide the necessary man-

power and the task could be accomplish_ed without involving
the United States in an Asian land· war.

Since this approach
I

had worked in Europe, applying it to· Southeast Asia seemed
27rbid., May 5, 1955,

togical.

The Courier-Journal therefore advocated a stp,ng
'

American commitment to the area, in economic aid but nbt
military assistance involving "in country" operations.·
•

••

I

As ear~y as October 1954 the United.States began1·
providing direct assistance to Diem and ceased operati~g its
aid program through the French.

By July, 1955 the French
•

I

had entirely evacuated Indo-China as required by the Geneva
'

I

Accords and American aid had partially filled the resulting
economic vacuum.
In 1954 and 1955, the Courier-Journal agreed witn
majority public ·opinion on Indo~China.
Communism remained in vogue.

Containment of

The Truman Doctrine remained

an integral part of American foreign policy and was applied
by the United States to anti-Communism in Southeast Asia.
The fall of China to the Communists in 1949 served as a
reminder to the public, and the Courier-Journal editorial
staff, of the Communist menace in Asia.

Also, the exp¢rience

of the Korean conflict brought haunting memories of the
horrors of a land war in Asia.

These memories served to

limit recommendations for Vietnam to economic aid.

The ·

Eisenhower.Administration refused ·to commit American ground
forces in Southeast Asia.
this policy.

The Courier-Journal supported·

Despite its occasional reference to military

intervention durtng the course of the year, by the end of
1955 the editorial staff had concluded that economic but
not•direct military assistance offered the best solutiop to
this "problem" in Asia; ..

CHAPTER II
THE DECUNE OF INTEREST AND ACTIVITY, 1956-1960
In 1956 no Vietnam-related editorials either staffwritten or syndicated were carried by the Courier-Journal.
There were several obvious reasons fo~ this paucity of ,comment.

First and foremost was th~ simple lack;of important

e·vents in Vietnam.

By 1956, Diem was clearly in power in

South Vietnam; just as Ho Chi Minh was firmly established
in the North.

Both were engaged in the 9o~solidation of

power.

The Communists seemed willing to await scheduled
..
elections which they felt would mean a victory, sans fighting· for them in South Vietnam.

They therefore conducted no
i

orgl!?ized guerilla operations which might alienate the population.

This conclusion is borne out by Barry Bingham,

Sr., p~esident of the Courier-Journal:

The "li:>w level of comment" on Vietnam from 1955
to 1958 indicated no preconceived editorial policy
ort our part, but was a reflection of general lack of
s4arp concern for affairs in that part of the world.
I bel~eve you would find thac·news columns at least
equally reflected this relative absence of interest.
We know now tqat conditions were developing during
those years which are still causing us grief and concern. At the time, affairs in Europe seemed of more
intens_e interest, involving more directly the Cold War
frictions between the United States and the Soviet
Union.l
1Personal letter to the author, August 10, 1970.
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to
President Kennedy, and author of A Thousand Days, has contended that "the civil war had.begun the year after the
cancellation of the elections.n 2 This would have put the

.

I

initiation of guerilla activities somewhere in 1957 ati the
earliest.

. I

Nevertheless Viet Cong supplies from the Nc;>r.th

could not have been plentiful until 1960.

Furthermore, not

until 1959 were elements of the Viet-Minh reactivated to
resume the rebellion and not until 1960 was the National
Liberation Front formed to carry out this task·. 3
The diversion of the editorial.attention of the paper
to more sensational and pressing matters was a secondary
reason for the silence of 1956.

Among these were:

a Presi-

dential election, the Communist shelling of the off shore
.

.

islands of Nationalist China, and the Hungarian revolt.
Consequently, little editorial page space remained for'
Vietnam comment and even less material· to ..fill it.

That .the

'

Courier-Journal was not alone on its scarcity of Vietnamrelated comment was clearly shown by the. fact that in ~he
same year, .the New York Times published only five such•
editorials.
During 1957, the total lack of Vietnam comment con-.
tinued in the Courier-Journal, resulting from the. Eisenhower
.

'.

'
. 2Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days .(Boston:.·
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 538.
I' .

'

3walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and·the Cold War,
1945-1965 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 15$.
!
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1ow-key policy on Vietnam and the lack of significant events
in that country.

Eisenhower deeply feared involving the

United States in another Korea.

He, of course, supported

the idea of containing Communism within its 1947 limit~ (as
did his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) but he
opposed using American forces to accomplish that end •.
I

Rather he favored supplying the means and training for the
South Vietnamese to handle their own troubles;

Furthermore,

no important change in administration policy toward Vietnam
occurred upon which the paper could comment.

The South
I

Vietnamese Army continued to be trained in Korea type warfare
I

and United States military advisors continued to be present,
.but this was quite common in many countries.

At the time

the United States was involved in training military personnel
from such varied c·ountries as West Germany, Korea, and Peru
either in their own locale or at various bases throughout
I'

-the United States.

Furthermore, the United States Army

·maintained at least ·one combat division in West Germany,
South Korea, France and japan.

Its Fleet Marine Force and

Seventh Fleet supported Nationalist China and its Ranger
School at·Fort·Benning, Georgia, provided training for Latin
American·and European as well as Asian army officers.
Viet Cong terrorism, it is true, had begun by the late
fifties but had not reached sufficient proportions as tb
;'

alarm the American press,

Indeed, the New York Times carried

only three Vietnam related editorials in 1957, none dealing
II

with Viet Cong terrorism.· Thus even this Viet Cong activity
did not ·stimulate the Courier-Journal's interest in Vietnam.
'
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As late as 1958, in ' readi-ng the Courier-Journal one
again encounters no Vietnam-related editorials; probab+y for
the reasons already cited.

New factors emerged that yJar,

including the Lebanon crisis, a domestic recession andlmid!

term congressional elections which served to divert editorial
· attention from Vietnam.

I

Like the Courier-Journal the New

York Times also failed to publish any Vietnam-oriented
comment in 1958, probably for the same reasons.
_The following year, the Communist Pathet Lao made an
attempt to take control in neutral Laos, clearly a violation
i

of the 1954 Geneva Accord •. The signatores could do little
to prevent this movement~

Their offer of ~conomic aid to

the neutralist regime was but a feeble effort. Because of
this, _on two occasions, 4 the Couri·er-Journal expressed
concern for the safety of Vietnam.

The paper feared the

spread of.Communist aggression across the lorig border I ·
'

.

between Laos and South Vietnam.

On both occasions, the

paper eXJ)ressed the idea that Laos might be the first of a
chain of countries to fall in domino fashion to Communism.
If. Laos·were
.

tq

be the first, it held, certainly by virtue
'

.

of· geography, if nothing else, South Vietriam would be the
second. ·nespite the fear for its continued existence, ·the
.

.

paper praised_the Diem Regime and the apparent.success of
its land reform program. 5 Other writers doubted that Diem
4The Courier-Journai'"· (Louisville), August 14 and
. .
September 15, 1959.
·.
5rbid., October 31, 1959.

J
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•

had any real intention of true· land reform.
I

6

Even the:

Pentagon Papers that were to gain so nruch notoriety in.later
I

investigations cast a shadow of doubt across the reform
'

program by concluding:

"The Diem land reform prog:ram \

instead of redistributing land to the poor, ended up taking
'I

back what the peasants had been given by the Vietminh and
returning it to the landlords :• 7 Only forced relocation of
villagers was carried out and. it served more to alienate- the
rural.population than to promote'the defensible concentrations
it was designed to establish •

. Even though it was optimistic about Diem, the CourierJournal was beginning to doubt the effectiveness of the
American aid program.

In January 1955, the United States

had begun to give aid directly to South Vietnam,

From 1955

to. 1957 this aid was largely confined to support of the
South Vietnamese Army and the land reform program.

It :was

administered through a complex "counterpart fund 11 which
allowed many.openings for possible gr~ft, mismanagement or
corruption.

According to Chester L. Cooper, who was involved

. in·. the. -administration of this aid,
. the fund was:

• -~· ·. ii device whereby Vietnamese importers purchas~d
certain essential goods • • • under a commercial import
program.· The American Government paid the seller of
these goods by depositing piasters into a special
counterpart fund. These funds were then made available . to the South Vietnamese Government • • • 80
6Horowi tz, £P.. cit. ,"·pp. 154-155.
7sheehan,· et al, The Pentagon.Papers (New York:
Bantam Books, 1971)-,-p. 71.
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I

percent of counterpart funds were used by the Ggvernment of South Vietnam for defense expenditures.
., .
The ·paper was beginning to discover corruption in this i
program and to sense an attempt to hide it on the partlof
I
the Eisenhower Administration.

This apparent concern over
I

the alleged corruption can probably be· attributed to sudden
I

I

increases in the size ~f the program.
Sources do not agree as to the precise amount of,aid.
LaFeber claims that in 1957 aid to South Vietnam amounted to
$50 million and in 1959 had grown to $207 million, while
Cooper thinks aid amounted to $1.2 billion between 195~ and
•

I

·1959 ior an average of $200 million~ year), and Schle~inger
contends aid at the end of the fifties averaged $300 million·
a year.

This range of figures probably resulted from the

inclusion of certain indirect commercial aid programs by·
.

.

some sources and dependence on direct aid alone by oth~rs.

9

While the paper could overlook graft in a $50 million program,
graft in a program over four times its.size generated
.
.---...__. cqn-

siderable interest.
At the same time that the paper wa·s beginning to have

doubts concerning the American aid program in Vietnam,, i ~
_acquired, in January, 1959, a staff member who would bring
these and many other alleged seamy aspects. of -this vexation
to the attention.of the staff and ·public.

This· perso~ was
'

.

.

· Scooper, The Lost Crusade (New York: Dodd Mead, 11970),
p. 165.
9 LaFeber, QE.• cit., p. 204.
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editorial cartonist Hugh Haynie.
paper's most severe war critic.

He was to develop into the
It would'be difficult to

exaggerate the effect of Haynie on the paper's Vietnam
policy.

His anti-war efforts were more visible and as,

widely used, as editorials and undoubtedly reached more
people with their message.

i

Though not clear at the time,

this 1959 staff change laid the ground work for future
important policy changes.
During 1960, the Courier-.Journal was silent on Vietnam
except for one syndicated .editorial, ,in which Joseph Alsop
warned of future trouble for the United States in Asia.
Alsop believed Diem was too much influenced by his relatives,
and his nepotism tended to destroy the few remaining
democratic tenets of the nation.

The silence of the Courier-

Journal staff is in part understandable in view of the fact
that 1960 was the year of a hotly-contested Presidential
election in which Vietnam was not an issue.

Secondly, no

·event occurred in Vietnam during 1960 sufficiently effective
to arouse editorial interest.

Even the United States Senate

in that year considered ending the Military Assist.ance and
Advisory G10up-Vietnam (MAAG-V) which consisted• of° only a
few men. 1
Furthermore no significant change in the low-

°

key Eisenhower policy toward Vietnam took place.

I

,

Despite

these factors, Joseph Alsop continued to warn of a worsening
situation in Southeast Asia. 11

lOschlesinger, 2£• £iE_., p. 539.
cit., p. 154.

cf. Horowitz,j op.

llThe Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 29, 1960.
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Consequently the period 1956-1960.ended without a
major United States commitment to Vietnam, even in an economic sense since aid to Diem at the close of the fifties
"averaged about $300 million a year." 12 Also no clear~
I
0

cut Courier-Journal reaction to United States poli cy on
I

Vietnam emerged.

Relative silence prevailed.

This reklected
i

the unnoticed and limited nature of the American commLtment,
and in larger part, mirrored.the discraction of editorial
I

attention to seemingly more pres'sing matters closer to ' home.

'.

,._

'
I'

12schlesin~er, .QB.• cit,, p, · 539. For contrastihg
..
-figures cf. LaFeber .QB.• cit., p, 204 and Horowitz, .1m:. ill•,
p. 154, .

CHAPTER III
THE KENNEDY YEARS, 1961-1963

I
I
I

• I
I

The years 1961-1963, the Presidency of John F.
Kenne.dy, included not only an increasi_ng United States

commitment to Vietnam but also a growing American fear for
the future of Southeast Asia.

Courier-Journal comment'for

the period reflected both of these developments.

The ;

depth and intensity of this fear by the Courier-Journal
staff seemed to grow in nearly direct proportion to the
American commitment.
During 1961, Joseph Alsop conti·.nued his pro-intervention policy in his syndicated series carried by the.
,

•

I

I

paper, expressing a fear of the possible domino-like fall of
.. :
Southeast Asia, _and advocating decisive action ip.cluding
the use of American troops to-deter any Communist aggression
which might trigger such a chain r~action. 1 . He fostered
the belief that the United States would take only hal~-,
measures. which· would not be sufficient_to salvag~- the
.

.

deteriorating situation in Vietnam.

In his view only strong

immediate decisive action could be-successful.
The Courier-Journal staff took a similar position on
'

1

The Courier-Journal (Louisville), March 30, April. 16,
18,. 20, October 7, 12, 24, 26, 27, 31, and-_November 3, 1961.
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the situation in Vietnam.

Assuming a more cautiously

pessimistic tone than that previously voiced, the staff
expressed a fear that United States aid to South VietniIDI had
'

been of the wrong type.

Such aid had equipped a conve~tional
.
I
army of 150,000 which was far out-classed by the mobile

forces of the Viet Cong, and had done little for the people
I
'
who, as a result, were slowly drifting toward Communisih. 2
•

Other sources were in agreement.

.

I

•

Walter LaFeber concluded

that ttthe American trained South Vietnamese Army could not
handle the guerrillas.tt 3 Thus the paper was far from alone
in its feelings;

Now disillusioned with Ngo Dinh Diem's failure to
apply western democracy to South Vietnam, to institute
governmental reforms and to win popular support at home,
the paper began to express deep concern about his ability to
effectively lead South Vietnam.

The paper's editorial staff
'

once more criticized Diem and concluded that continued,

support of him was in error.
properly gove.rn South Vi~ tnam.
interest at heart.

Diem could not, it believed,
He did· not have the people I s

Furthermore, it stated, the United States

should have learned one ·important lesson from Laos where it
had mistakenly backed a dictator solely because he ~as ·prowestern.

Backing such men .as Diem in South Vietnam was as

likely to alienate the people as backing Boun Oum, the

2rbid., April 19, 1961.
3

p. 156.

LaFeber,

.Q.I?.•

.£!:!., p. 226.

cf.

Horowitz, .Q.I?_.
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fonner dictator of Laos who received extensive United States
.. 4

support yet was ousted by his own people.

I

Retaining the

support of the people, the paper concluded, was more important
than an extremely pro-western government.

Diem needed to

broaden the base of his government, allow·more popular,

I

participation and end harsh restrictions on civil libe~ties.
I

His anny needed training in counter-insurgency warfare and
could gain little from the large unit _tactics taught by
th_e western powers.

What the pa~er ignored irt this evalu-

ation was that South Vietnam lacked a tradition of western
democracy, of any kind of democracy.

The paper implied

1

that United States type government could _b~ transplanted
intact to .Vietnam and should be so applied by Diem.

Such

was not the case, and it was poor judgment on the paper's
part to believe it could or should be done.
_May of 1961 saw Vice President Lyndon B.• _Johnson on a

fact~finding mission to South Vietnam.

Johnson was impressed

with the Diem regime, indeed enough so to call Diem the
5
"Winston ·churchill of Asia, tr
and to· advise President
'Ke~n~dy_to meet the Communist challenge in Vietnam. 6 Also
in 1961,. at .the conclusion of thE!ir fact-finding mission to
Vietnam, presidential aide Walter Rostow and Anny General
Ma:i:cwell D. Taylor issued_a report on the conduct of the war.
According . to A'rthtir M". Schlesinger, J,;.·, this report served to:
I

4The Courier-Journal'-{Louisville), May 9, 1961.
5

6

.

LaFeber, ££· cit., p. 228.
.

--

Ibid., p. 222.
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, , • color future thinking about Vietnam in both
Saigon and Washington (to assume) • • • that
Vietnam was primarily a military rather than a
political problem,?

1

'

. According to L.aFeber the report advised "increaJing the
number of American military advisors and pledging comJlete
j
8
support to Diem. rt
Since it recommended a military commitment the report may well have reinforced Joseph Alsop·_,[s_
conviction that Vietnam was a military problem"and an urgent
one at that.

Its recommendations for military involvement,
however, did not satisfy Alsop. 9 Perhaps the report did not
advocate sufficient massive involvement,

The Courier-Journal

had no staff-written editorial reaction to this report', and
thus either considered it of little significance or had no
opinion (or insufficient unity of opinion to compose a staff
editorial).

Obviously the lack of comment supports the

contention that the paper had iittl~ objection to Kennedy 1 s
policy of using American military personnel in the training
and logistic support of the South Vietnamese.

Neither.did it

object to the creation of MAA?-V (Military Assistance and
Advisory Group-Vietnam).
In 1962, the Courier-Journal staf_f also took·.a some·w~at cautious.·stand, while approving of ·Kennedy 1s increa~ed
economic aid to South Vietnam, as well as increases. in the
7schlesinger, £2• .£!.!,, p. 545.
8 LaFeber, £2• .£!,!,, p. 228. cf. Horowitz,
£2·, . cit.,

p, 156.

I.
9The Courier Journal (Louisville), October 30, 1961.

number of MAAG-V advisors.

Despite its seeming cautious-

ness, the· Courier-Journal was adamant on one point--if :.a
stand against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia were to
10
be made, Vietnam was the place to draw the line.
Asloft1

I

times before, however, the paper contended it.was a st~nd
I

Certainly these

only to be taken by Vietnamese troops,

I

forces might be American-supplied and American:-trained,·
but no United States combat forces should be used.

The

paper saw something ominous about the arrival of four ,
hundred Marines and sixteen helicopters in April.

This

seemed to indicate forthcoming massive combat troop in~olve.
11
· .ment, a maneuver the paper did not support.
Still the
paper di~ not object editorially when, in the fifteen months
following the Taylor-Rostow report the President increased
the number of United States advisors from 500 to 10,000 and
attached them to Vietnamese combat uni ts • 12 - Perhaps_ t;he
paper's traditional pro-Democrat stance and its ·admiration
for ·President Kennedy accounts for the strange silence.Agreeing with Alsop, the Cou~ier-Jourrtal also saw grave
.

.

danger to South Vietnam and to alt Southeast Asia as the·
result of Communist aggression in Laos.-. ·Perhaps this ,vi.ew
_prompted the paper's tacit acc_eptance--of advisor increases.

lOThe Courier-Journal (Loui~ville), February 12!and
March 19, 1962.
11 rbid., April 18, 1962.
12LaFeber; 22• cit., p. 229.
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Southeast Asia continued to be a thorny problem,' In
this area the Courier-Journal was committed to two conflicting policies.

It desired to see the United States aid the

'

I

South Vietnamese in thwarthing the growing Communist tp.reat
I

'
and yet keep American fighting men out of Southeast Asia.
Laos and South Vietnam, it contended, were in grave danger
I

and the United States was about to become involved in an
Asian land war.
solutions.

To the paper, there seemed to be·no simple

Unlike Alsop; the paper could not approve

drastic steps likely to include mass troop commitment.

13

Rather the staff sought a_middle course, neither hawk por
dove.

To accomplish this, the paper advocated continuation

of previous policies but-with greater emphasis on helping
these threatened nations toward military preparedness.

Thus

the paper wanted a deeper more far reaching commitment to
meet the widening crisis,

but certainly not a military

commitment.
Joseph Alsop continued his syndicated columns along
. the same pro-involvement lines in 19_62, calling for wider
American part.icipation in the war.

Bi-partisan support of

an extensive American engagement in South Vietnam, including
the use of combat units was predicted. 14 Later, his columns.
praised the strategic hamlet program, a move designed to
concentrate the rural population· in a few "strategic"'
13 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), M"ay 15, 26, f 29,
and June 4, 1962.
I

.14rbid., February 24 and M"ay 5, 1962.
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villages for more adequate defense against the Connnuni!sts,
I

.

as a success, 15 and lauded the fighting ability of American
helicopter units in South Vietnam. 16 Alsop believed both
moves would counter recent Connnunist advances and make!
defenses more flexible and realistic.

On two occasion,s,

Alsop maintained that Connnunist.wars of liberation in
Southeast Asia were inter-related:
The question in Laos is whether it is wise to
hand the back door of South Vietnam over to the
communists while pouring men and munitions into
S9uth Vietnam through the frbnt door.17
Like the domino theory, the "backdoor" idea--the notion that
Connnunist aggressors could outflank South Vietnam's defenses
by ·control of and infilitrati.on through La9s--was a popular
18
version of the Southeast Asian situation in 1962,
claiming
suppo_rt both with. the general public and in high government
c:i,rcies.

Tn line with this thinking, Alsop was among the.

firs-t to .advocate that the United States make· an armed
intrusion into Laos in order to deprive the Viet Cong of an
importan~ supply route. 19

"15rbid. ;_May 4, 1962. The Strategic Hamlet program
was one- el:fort to make the count-ryside more defensible by
f9rcibly relocating the villagers in defensible garrison
strongholds called Strategic Hamlets. The overall effect of
this policy was often the alienation of peasants and loss
rather_ than gain of government support.
16 rbid.; May 1, and August 21, 1962.
17
_ rbid., May 17, 1962.
18LaFeber, .2£· cit.~.pp. 228-229 and p, 256.
19 The Courier-J.ournal (Louisvi-lle), April 19,
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The closing months of 1962 saw the Courier-Journal
alter its ·editorial policy to justify_President Kenned~ 1 s
increase in the size of MAAG-V--to· 11,300 advisors.

This

action :was clearly an escalation of the war in Vietnam;
This _alteration was primarily the work of staff writer I
.

I

Weldon James, a Karine Corps Reserve Colonel who had just
I

.

returned from the Far East.

James maintained that American

troops were no longer hated or condemned as white men in a
yellow man's Asiatic war. 20 He heaped praise upon the,
American Spe·cial Forces counter-insi:irgency efforts, 21 as
well as the use of Americaµ technological warfare, sucn as
helicopter airlifts and vertical envelopment.22

In defending

the Americ_an war effort, James was far more prolific than
any other staff writer in 1962.
As the most military-oriented writer on the CourierJournal staff, Weldon James had seen his share of war.

As a

United Press bureau chief he was present during the bombin•g
of Nanking in 1937.

From 1942 to 1947 he was a Marine

officer serving in both the Pacific and Europe and iater on
occupation duty in North China and Japan.

In the latter

experience he had seen first hand the acti'vities of. Communist
insurgents.

Joining the Courier-Journal in 1948, lie remai'ned _·

as a reporter and later associate editor until. 1966,-when

20Ibid., December 12, 1962.
2lrbid., D~cember 16, 1962.
22Ibid., December 23, 1962.

l
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I

he resigned to join the Fleet Marine Force Pacific as a
special staff officer.

Since 1942 James had retained member-

ship in the Marine Corps Reserve, returnin~ to active quty
in 1950-1952 to serve in Korea.

Though perhaps he had;

played a major part in shaping all Courier-Journal Vietnam
policy since 1954, not until 1962 did his opinion becoJe
visible when he. published a series of bylined editorials
following a visit to Vietnam.

Courier-Journal president

Barry Bingham said of James, 11 He is one of the fortunate
people who can see the issues of Viet Nam in clear sharp
outlines of black and white. 11

His 1962 bylined editori:als

made his advocacy of involvement clear.
During 1962, other syndicated columnists carried by
the Courier-Journal also supported American enlargement of
the war, some earlier _than the paper itself.

James Reston

claimed that 11 a good case can be made for United States
I

intervention against Soviet-supplied North Vietnamese guer.rillas.1123

Similarly,' Homer Bigart, also
of the New York
.
.

Times, called for an improvement in the United States effort
to.win the faith of the .South Vietnamese people. 24
The·Courier-Journal did not draw such conclusions so
early.

The fact that it reached similar conclusions as

1962 progressed may be attributed to the presence of Weldon
James on its staff.

Support of aid to South Vietnam in its

23 rbid., February 18, 1962.
24rbid., July 29, 1962.

i
efforts -to eliminate the V.iet Cong was at least partia~ly
I
'

.

attributable to the conservative publishership of M"ark'V.
Ethridge (while not an advocate of massive intervention,
E~~idge was a strong anti-Communist).
Nevertheless, despite its escalation in 1962, thJ war
I

had remained rather small and far from costly (in December
'

the casualty·coun~ stood at forty-two according to James),
Such a "war" seemed patriotic at the ~ime, and relatively
easy. to support.

After nearly t~n years of peace, war had

lost much of its horror to the American people;

M"any people·

seemed to view the United States as the savior of demo9racy
in A~ia.

Fighting in Vi.etnam in 1962 to save democracy

seemed as plausible as had fighting in France in 1917.
Since World War II the· American public had come to believe

that.Western Democracy could be exported everywhere and
cou~d not accept the idea that non-western cultures could.
not, and· perhaps sho~ld not, attempt to assimilate western
cultu~.

As time went on, ho~ver, rising costs and

lengthening casualty lists would make the war more abhorrent.
Consequently fewer persons and institutions would offer it
·much support.
. .
In addition to conservative ~ublishing practices and
tl;le relative newness of the enlarged war, a third factor
accounting for the paper's support of the expansion of the
war, was its attitude toward Pr.esident Kennedy.

The Courier-

Journal viewed Kennedy mo~e favorably than it later did
Lyndon Johnson and since the paper had not to any grea,t
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extent criticized Kennedy's conduct of foreign affairs~ it
\

was in a more advantageous position to support his actions
in Vietnam.

During this same year, the Courier-Journal,
I

largely through James' editorials, supported the war effort
I
more strongly than it would in later y_ears. I:t had nol yet
concluded as had the Toronto Telegram that 11 this is a c;lirty,
cruel war--as dirty an~ cruel as the war waged

py the French
1

forces in Algeria which so shocked the American conscience : 2 s
Nor had it decided as had The Nation that· 11 by now it should
be perfectly clear that American forces in Sou½h Vietnam are
engaged not in protecting

1

freedom' but in the essentially
'

ugly business of suppressing a massive peasant insurrection
against the Diem regime. 1126

Whether or not what The Nation

said was accurate, the fact remains that these publications
opposed American involvement in.Vietnam in. 1962 long before
,•,

. I

the Courier-Journal considered such a course.of action.I

Also that year the Courier-Journal appeared to believe that
the role of the American military mission in South Vietnam
was both moral and ethical.

This alone was enoug;h tb con-

vince the editorial staff that such ·was a necessary action.
·In 1963, many events both in Vietnam-and on the domestic·
scene evoked much Vietnam-related comment from the Courier~
Journal and its syndicated columnists •. During the year
while the situation in Vietnam worsened, the presidency-of·
II

25H orowi' tz,

QQ.•

· t , p. 156 •
g_.

2 6The Nation, January 19, 1963.
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the paper changed hands.

Barry Bingham took over the

publishership from Mark Ethridge.

I

These factors combi~ed.to

''I

make ·1963 a pivotal point-in Vietnam opin;ion for the paper.
Not only did the Viet Cong appear to be winning on the
battlefield, but the ,.people of South Vietnam, mainly
Buddhists·, rose in defiance of the Catholic Di_em regime •
1

. Subsequently, Diem lost favor with the United States and
/

fell to an army coup in November.

With these events th~

first signs of chronic governmental instability appeare~ in
Vietnam.

f

'
The Diem government clearly was corrupt and inadeguate.
I
-, When
1

it fell, however, nothing better was available to ·,

. replace it,

In fact, nothing even as effective could be
'
found. South Vietnam had deposed its only strong. leader
'
and replaced him with a weak military government.

Such action instigated a wave of pessimism in the!
'I
Qnited States in regard to an eventual victory, and the r

!

-

staff blamed Diem and his government for this decline i~.
morale. 27 The· staff also·supported the._Buddhist revolt!.
against gov:ernment oppression from. the time. of its ini t~ation
. ,·
28
'
in August.·
The Courier-Journal had obviously lost all
I

faith in the Diem regime for it stated that,

'

11

Viel;nam 1 s :

f_amily rule must end soon • .- • it is clearly past time !for

I

27 The Courier-Journal
I
.
(Louisville), July 10, 11, and
August 14, 1963.
28 rbid., August ·20, 22, and 23, 1963.
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.Diem to go. n 29

I

Apparently the paper had tired of Die~ 1 s
'

corruption, his nepotism in high positions, and his failure,
in spite of hopeful beginnings, to meet the needs of the
people, especially.where land reform was concerned.

The

most frequently voiced complaint, however, concerned the
brutal oppression of the Buddhis_t majority in South Vi\etnam
·and Diem's favoritism toward the rich Catholic minority.
Editorial support for the Buddhist majority and opposition

tq Diem was really nothing new for the Courier-Journal.
The paper like many other publications had advocated
equitable redistribution of land and Buddhist particip~tion
I

in go-yernment since 1954.

·Critical editorials continued

throughout September and October, but ceased in mid-November.
Two clear reasons account for this sudden cessation of
hostility toward Diem.

The primary and most obvious reason

is that Diem and his government were overthrown in early
I

November by an army coup.

They were therefore·, no longer

present to be criticized.

Nearly as obvious a reason was

the assas_sinati_on of President Kenned): on November 22 •.
..

Comment on .this event monopolized much of the space allotted
. edi.to.rials for· .the remainder of the year.

Thus the paper

carried· no· staff-written Vietnam-related editorials in ,late
November.or December 1963.
In this year_, as iri previous years, the syndicated
series carried by the Courier-Journal closely paralleled
f

...

29rbid., August -29, 1963.

.
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the staff-written series as they concerned Vietnam.

Walter

Lippmann, ·who had replaced David LawrElnce and the Alsops for
reasons to be discussed later, saw victory as impossible in
Vietnam, but viewed Diem as an evil necessity for maint'ainence
'

of the status quo.

He, however, advocated pressure on Diem
I
as well as an American effort to win the confidence of lthe
South Vietnamese people. 3 0
Other syndicated writers in 1963. also exhibited this
loss of faith both in Diem and the war effort·.

C. L.

Schulzberger of the New York Times wrote that the failure of
SEATO .to act had doomed the war effort. 31 Both M"ax Frahke1 32
.

I

and James Reston33 condemned Diem's censorship while Da~id
Halberstram34 and Robert Trumbu1135 excoriated the inequity
of Diem's rule (10 per cent Catholics over 90 per cent
Buddhists).

Finally, William R; Frye praised the coup bf

November which overthrew Diem, foreshadowing talk of a

1

negoitated peace in Vietnam.36
·Obviously the 1963 editorial position of the CourierJournal on Vietnam differed from its policy of the previou.s
30
.
Ibid., .September 6, 7, and 19, 1963.
·31ibid., April 9, 1963.
32rbid., July 4, 1963.

-

33rbid., September 12, 1963'.
34Ibid.
35 Ibi·d., September 3, 1963.
36rbid., November 18, 1963.

i .
I

'
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The paper in 1963 more clearly aligned itself against

year,

Diem, and, to some extent, against the war itself.

The_paper

supported the war effort less in 1963 than it had previously'
and presented syndicated columnists who voiced such sui:iport
less often.
The primary reason for this shift in editorial policy
I

was the elevation of Barry Bingham to editor and publisher
following the resignation of conserva~ive publisher M'ark
Ethridge.

-

certainly

The change which occur.red on September 15, was

a significant factor in the development of a pew

I

editorial policy as regards Vietnam.

I

· .· ··Barry Bingham was far more internationalist in his
outlook than Ethridge had been.

A 1928 magna £1:!!!! laude

graduate of Harvard and holder of six honorary degrees,
Bingham joined the Courier-Journal in 1930.

A longtime,
I

· Naval Reserve officer, he served in the European Theater.
'

of Operations 1941-1945 and briefly in the Pacific during
the last year of World War II.

Bingham has been, by his own

admission·,· a lifelong Democrat.

In tlie .. 1952 election, p.e

· served·as national chairman of the Volunteers for Adlai
Stevenson, and the following sprtng accompanied Stevenson
on anarqund-the-w?rld tour.
bo~h Saigon and Hanoi,

D1;1ring this tour, he visi'ted

These 1953 impressions, Bingham.

agrees, have affected his thinking on.Southeast Asia ever
si'nc_e.

In his international thinking, however, Bingham:

was more profoundly affectlo-d by European experiences,

I

I
Having spent a year as Chief of the M'arshall Plan M'ission
I
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to France he was deeply imbued with its tenets and impressed
l

'

with its success.

.Later he stated. that similar self-help
. !

p_lans could and perhaps should _be applied. elsewhere in iorder .
to achieve similar results.

Perhaps such 'ideas led him to

support the use of economic rather than military aid i1
meeting the Far East crisis.

After 1945, when .he beca~e an
I

editor, his influence steadily increased.

By 1969 he ~as
i

editor, publisher and chairman of the board of WHAS Incorporated (which included the.Courier-Journal) as well as the
paper 1 s president.
This change appears to have immediately fostered ia
rapid growth in Vietnam comment.

i .

This increase may, ho.wever,

be more rightly attributed to increased Buddhist protest
activity in Vietnam or to the rising cost.of the war (by
now $1.5 million a.day) rather than any staff change.
Most likely the disappearance of Ethridge opened the door
'
I
and the Bud~hist uprising offered the-occasion. Although
.

I

events in Vietnam may account for the increase in comment
level, the· s~ift in syndicated columnis'ts from the more;
I

•

militant pro-involvement Alsop and Lawrence to the more,
•

.

. 'I

.

pacifist and anti-involvement Lippmann may be attribute? to .
'

the rising influence of.such persons as Bingham, anti-war
.

.

'

•

i

~artoonist Hugh Haynie and the dove who became Bingham's
I

edi.torial page editor:..-Molly c·1owes.
was beginning.

Thus policy chimgJ

Seemingly, like more and more AmericansJ-

the management of the paper was beginning to question. ~e
role of America in Southeast Asia.

While not the front [

I
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runner of all public opinion, the Courier-Journal led midwest newspapers in assuming this viewpoint.

I•

.

I
'

.

CHAPTER IV
'IHE EARLY JOHNSON YEARS, 1964-1965

General Nguyen Rhanh 1 took control of th~ Saigon·
• .

'I

government during 1964 ·and at first appeared so stable_ ;that
the Courier-Journal sta_ff expressed confidence in his
positive control of the country. 2

'r

I
But despite its con-:

fidence in Khanh 1 s ability, the paper held that.the Vietnam
I

situation remained grave.

3

. Supporting the Courier-Journal

position was Davi_d Holden of the M"anchester (England)
Guardian whp praised Khanh 1 s ability to unify the South,
Vietnamese people. 4 · Other contributors to the edi torial I·
01

,

I

.I
•. I

.
1General Nguyen Khanh was South Vietnam's
Premier
from February, 1964, through mid-February, 1965. Since 1
1968, he has been in exile in Paris. Educated at the
I ·
1§:ilitary Academy of Dalat, Khanh later attended the Unit~d
States Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;·. H~
fought "first as a guerrilla against the French and later 1.
as a French Colonial Forces paratrooper. By· 1_954, he had
risen to the rank of major. Rhanh was instrumental in
,.
foiling the 1960 coup against Diem. He carefully remaine'd
on the. sidelines in the 1963 coup which overthrew Diem. ·
Khanh was a Buddhist but not popular with the militant
Buddhist majority in South Vietnam. ·. His main support cam'e
from American advisors in Vietnam who thought of him- (as ;
he ·thought of himself) as "a fighter." . (New York Times, ,
Jm• Sil•> P• 633) •
.

I

1

2The Courier-Journal (Louisviile) 1 January 3~,. 1964[.
3rbid., M"arch 4, 1964.
4rbid., June'30, 1964.

44

I

45
pages though, such as Chal,mers M. Roberts, of the Los
Angeles Times·, who despite his personal ·admiration
for ·Khanh,
.
.
··- disagreed, viewing the situation in Vietnam as hopeles~. 5
A harsher judgment came from Stanley Karnow of the London
I

Observer, who claimed that Khanh lacked sufficient .dri ~e to
I
lead South Vietnam effectively. 6. Thus, although the paper
appeared to support Khanh through its staff-written editorials., it presented some syndicated writers who expressed
doubts about his abilities.
Perhaps the paper was simply employing an accepted
practice of ideal journalism, showing both sides of a c,on-

..

troversial issue.

More likely, however, the paper had some

lingering doubts about Khanh 1 s ability and; lacking the
staff-unity to compose editorials, resorted.to using
syndi~ated writers.
Other sources seem to agree with the paper 1 s evalpation
of Khanh..

Dennis J. Duncanson, member of the British

Mission to·Vietnam 1961-1965 and Counselor for Aid in the
Saig9n British -Embassy 1965-1966, saw·Khanh as a strong man
·intent.on unifying the country but one who had inherited
a_riearly_ imp_oi;;s.ible situation.

He,faile·d

primarily because

of the· intrigues of_ various politico-religious se~ts wi'thin
the count~. 7 Bernard Fall, noted French Indo-China expert
. 5.

Ibid., February 7, 1964.
6
rbid., February ,15,.,J,964.
7Dennis J". Duncanson, Government and Revolution in
Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 348-

349.

·
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and author of several booKs qn ~ndo-China ranging from 1954
to his death in 1966, also contended that the same Buddhist
unrest which toppled Diem undermined Khanh.

I

8

I

UnfortunJtely,

·

· he .concluded, Khanh was the "object of a press buildup of,
vast p~oportions • • • that later events failed to·subl
. stantiate. 119 The Courier-Journal apparently was a part of
•

I
I

this· press build-up and, taking the United States offi~ial
view of Khanh 1 s past performance .and character at face,
value, lauded him in its columns.

When this viewpoint 1later
'

.

.

-

proved to be g~eatly distorted, the paper was sorely d:iJs-

.

I

appointed in the Johnson Administration as well as in Khanh.

I

This disappointment probably served to mak~ the paper more
skeptical of such glowing praise in the future •
. During 1964, with the increase in American forces to
I

•

I

23 ,.000 men including large combat type uni ts, there lo~med
. .

.

I

•

a distinct. possibility of large
scale American intervention
.
'
· and, in

a cautious

1

tone, the staff ~xpressed fear that imme-

diate action would initiate a Korea-sized war. 10
coluinnist

q. L;

!

Syndi;cated

Schulzbe.rger, on the ~ther hand, claime'.d

'

that·:i.inmediate. action toward more massive American involve'

in.ent. was necessary to avoid defe~f.11

'l

Thus; .a conflict: of

8 Berna:rd Fall, Vietnam Witness (New•York: Frederich R.
Pr~eger, .1966)., p. 28 •
i
. . 9·
.
!
·
Ibid., P• ,289. c.f. Theodore Draper.in Twentieth
CenturyAiiierica, ·pp. 478-479.

I

lOrhe Courier-Journal.._ (Louisville), February 28, 1 64.
llrbid., February 29, .1964.
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opinion could be found on the editorial pages of the
..

Courier-Journal in regard to future action in Vietnam.
That the Courier-Journal approved of_ the early Johnson

.. I

.

policy, which mirrored that of his predecessor on Vietnam,
is. apparent in its approval of Secretary of Defense Ro_J ert ·
1
McNamara's fact-finding visit ·to Vietnam which recommended
.
I
continuation of existing Kennedy12 polic:i,es, Despite this,

however, the paper continued to express some reservations
'
about es~alation of the w~r. 13 Indeed; the staff looke~
'

upon that possibility with extreme disfavor.

'
i

It saw also a

dangerous es~alatio~ possibility in enlarging the Vietnkmese
I
14
Air Force, but none. in aiding the Vietnamese Army.
· T~e
'
Vietnamese Air Force, it felt, was far more likely to carry

the war into North Vietnam,

'

Clearly the paper felt the;war

should be confined to the South, since extension to the!

I

North would mean the involvement of more American ground

.

troops,

I.

This was not the proper course to follow, the i

paper contended.

'

Like· most of the American public, at the

time, the paper was uninformed that the war had already 1 been
I

·.

carried North •. Soll\e of the citizenry did know, for Hor6witz.
!

contends it was reliably reported that raids into North '

Vietnam by South Vietnam forces under United States guiqance
12 rbid,, March 9 and June. 2, 1964.
13rbid,, May _21, 31 and July 30, 1964.
14 Ibid,, April 19, 1964.
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had been going on since 1961.

I

15

When this information:

finally ccµne to light in late 1965 the paper·became furtherembit_tered at the Administration_, now headed by Lyndon ,
Johnson.

·

·

·. 1

Departing from its support of the President in the
!

'

first quarter of 1964, the paper began· to argue that J~hnson
was taking unnecessary risks and over-extending_the American
presence in Southeast Asia. 16 Subsequently, in August, it
anticipated the danger of rapid and massive escalation
emanating from the Gulf of Tonkin17 incident in which North
Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked two United ~tates
15Horowitz, ~- ~ - , p. 429. cf. New York Times
rnternational Edition, May 23 and 24, 1964 and December 5
and 6, 1964. As late as January 17, 1965, The CourierJournal was only beginning to realize this fact. On that
date, a staff-written editorial claimed that the United.
States had been involved in raids on North.Vietnam, but'the
people had not been so informed. In such ca~es, the paper
held, 11 the President should level with us. 11
'
16 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), M13,y 27, December_.,
23 and 29, 1964. .
· . -•
, .
17rn 1964, American naval units pat~o.lled the. International waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. When on August 2,
1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the United
States Navy destroyers Turner Joy and Maddox, Presid,ent: ·
Lyndon B. Johnson ordered air strikes by carrier-based.aircr?ft of the United States Seventh Fleet against North
Vietnam •. Congress almost unanimously (House 416-0 and
Senate 88-2) approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution sup~
porting the President in 11 all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of the United States
and· to prevent further aggression. 11 · President Johnson, s.
quick reaction found support both at home and abroad, This
support, however, did not last. The fear of over-reactfon
to a minor incident soon began to arise. Some ·influent:Ual ·
persons, mainly Senators J. William Fulbright,· Wayne Mors_e,
and Ernest Gruening, feared an unneces~ary widening of the
war would result. Most at the. time, however, fe1t that'
speed and the appearance of national unity were the essential
considerations.
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·des.troyers on routine patrol off the North Vietnamese
coast in the Gulf of Tonkin1 and Johnsonis apparent over~
reaction to it, 18 The paper supported his order for immediate reaction by the two American vessels involved but
I

questioned the necessity of retailatory bombing ang projected
troop increases in South Vietnam,

I
Indeed, the staff felt
that
I

the incident-had resulted more from a low level command'
mistake than a North Vietnamese effort. to escalate the war,
The incident it feared would be all too easy to construe as
an act of aggr~ssion, and accordingly anticipated Johnson's
reaction of massive escalation,

Rather than escalate the

war the Courier-Journal suggested that Johnson might instead
tighten destroyer patrol procedure in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Ll.ke others later, the paper at this time, obviously believed
that ~ot all of the blame lay with the North Vietnamese,
and its editorials offered the possibility that the Un:Lted·
i

States had been. in error or at least overly aggressive •.

The paper's attitude in this incident is indicative of its
reac_tion ·to governmental action through_out the year,
.

The

.

paper agreed with Johnson's decision that there should be
some reactiqn_ to.this North VietF1amese move,_ but felt he
was simply moving too far too fast and over-reacting to the
Vietnam situation.
Ce]'.'._tainly the Courier-Journal in 1964 hacf supported
Johnson, at least tacitly, in his .early Presidency,

....

I

Perhaps

I
18
I
The Courier-Journal (Louisville), August 4, 5, and
I
9_,.- 1964.
'

i
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this was a carry-over fro~ support of Ke~nedy but eve~ lmore
likely it was the combination of two factors, the inability
to react to a'Vietnam policy that had not yet become cqn1

· crete, and the act of allowing the new President a chance
\

to develop his own Vietnam policy.

In any case, once the
i

·Johnson Vietnam policy jelled, the Courier-Journal oppo'sed it,
both.in its staff-written editorials and in .the syndicated
columns it carried,
Two well-known syndicated writers, Walter Lippmann
and James Res ton, were in agreement,_

Lippmann's column

'
appeared eleven times throughout the year and in it he ad-

vocated negotiation and an all-encompassing political
solution which would,

extend from Siberia to the Himalayas,
from the Mekong to the Yalu, 1119 Like Lippmann, syndicated
11

columnist James Reston was carried more frequently in 1964,
Reston too argued for neutralization of all of·Indo-Chi~~.zo
.

.

Perhaps the_ tide of editorial opinion had now -com". I

pletely·turned.

The y~ar 1965 saw the Courier-Journal fully implement
_the_ antf-:war, ap.ti-Johnson policy it would follow until
•

Jqhnson:Js retirement from the White House;
The first half of the year was· a period fraught wi, th
edi·torial fear of continued escalation and pleaii

for

neg'otiation before such escalation might become 'inevitaqle,
'.

... .

19 rbid,, Dece_mber 23, 1964.
20rbid,, February 1, 1964.
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.The staff-written editorials of the Courier-Journal fol this
period reflected many such pleas while expressing lack of
confidence in the Saigon government. 21

Similarly staff-written

editorials and cartoons warned of the danger qf a nucl1ar ·
holoc;;iust inherent in seeking victory in Vietnam through
continual escalation, 22 Obviously the paper had conclt~ded

.i

that there was to be little chance of a clear-cut solution
. ;

to Vietnam and certainly no immediate one.

It had begun to
'

doubt the Administration's contention that victory was 'just
'

around the corner and that another five or ten ·thousand;

· troops could make the crucial difference between victory and
•

defeat.

I

Indeed, the paper had begun to doubt if°· victory were

possible and desirable at all in a military sense.

As Mr.

Bingham explained it, his discouragement with Vietnam
evolved from "the tragic sequence · of ·events in Vietnam,/ the
piling up of casualties, and the progressive ·evidence that ·
military power is unable to secu;e a clean-cut sol~tionl in.:,·
Indo-China.n 23
Subsequently articles appeared that advocated neg9tiations aimed at a restoration pf the 1954 Geneva accords,
.
'

those· same agreements which the paper had disparaged in

1954 as an "Asian Munich."

'

· ·.
1

Ultima·tely,'the Courier-Journai

staff held there was little to gain and· much to lose ·from a
I

1·

I
21 rbid., January 17, 27, 28, 29, 30, February -5, 9,
16, 17; zo,'""""24, M'arch 1, 2, 3, and April 4, 1965.

2 2 rbid., March 4 and April 4; 19'65.
23 Letter from Barry Bingham, Sr., August 10, 1970.
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continuation -of the war.

Therefore, the paper began to

intensely advocate negotiation to end the war before tJe ·
cost in lives as well as dollars became p~ohibitive. 24
Despite.its gloomy predictions of escalation and interminal
war, however, the paper through its staff writer John
Fetterman, an infrequent writer of signed editorials making
his only Vietnam comment in April, 1965, saw hope for 1sia
'
in economic growth through the establishment of a M"ekorig
I

I

project along the lines of TVA.

Fetterman published a~
'

article entitled ttMekong Project - Alternative to War."' He
suggested _three possible courses in.the Vietnam war:
escalation, moving the war to North Vietnam, and neutral'

ization of all Vietnam through negotiation.

None of tnese
I

possibilities had much merit he argued.
.course should be contemplated,

Rather, a four;th

Citing the fact that

guerrillas had not halted engineering projects in the South,
.
.
.
.
I.
he proposed a project for the economic unification- of a,11
•
.
I
.
.
I.
Southeast Asia--development of the Mekong River, He thought
!

such a development would be cheap by comparison to the cost
.

i

of .war and would contribute to the unification of the region,
ending any threat of war.

His project would, like TVA, pro-_

.vide electricity for homes, farms, and industry.· It would

I ..
·. I

control flooding, thus permitting an increase in rice production and allowing continuous navigation.

M"oreover it would

give the.people along the Mekong a common bond.which cohld
.
.
.
C I
24The Courier-Journal (Louisville), February 25, i965.

·:.
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transcend national boundaries and ideological differences.
In an accompanying editorial the Courier-Journal staff'
agreed.

I

They contended the project could "kill hunger,'.

ignorance and poverty in Southeast Asia without which·
Counnunis t revolt cannot live. n

J

I

Admittedly the whole·idea

i

was visionary but, "measured against the other alternatives
that face us in Southeast Asia, the Kekong project may •be,
not so wild a dream,n 25 One can see the basic philosophy of
Barry Bingham in that the Courier-Journal contended that
·only through economic developnent could Asia be stabliz,ed,
not by military means of any sort.

Obviously the pape; had
I

found Vietnam a socio-political, as well as military p~bblem
and was offering some hope of an economic solution,
In a speech of April 7, 1965 at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson offered unconditional negotiatipns
with Hanoi and proposed an internationally financed Asian
Development·Bank for peace-time reconstruction of the area.
This evoked favorable comment from the Courier-Journal ~taff.
But this period of favorability lasted only from about
April 8 to -Apri_l 25, 26 when the paper began to express·

I

doubts about the real p~ssibility of fruitful negotiations. 27
Since no concrete action toward negotiation had been· taken,

the paper began to seriously doubt Johnson's expressed

25rbid,, April 4, 1965,
26 rbid,, April 9, 13, and 20, 1965,
2 7lli£., April 25 and 26, 1965,

I

I
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desire for peace and feared he would turn to escalatiori in
i
seeking victory.2 8 Hope for peace ebbed so low that the
bombing halt of May 13-19 failed to receive editorial ,
attention, much less any hope for peace.
Paralleling the staff-written editorials of the period,
syndicated writer Walter Lippmann, as on previous occasilons,
I

'
He

advocated termination of the war through negotiation.
also argued for agreement along the lines of the 1954
Geneva accords. 29 The alternative, Lippmann, held, was

continual escalation which would ultimately lead to world
'

conflict.
James Reston of the New York Times followed similar
lines in his Vietnam comment for the first half of 1965. 30
Even C. L. Schulzberger, also of the Times and normally mo:re
hawkish, professed.that Vietnam was an endless morass of
deeper and deeper American involvement. 31 Subsequently;
other syndicated writers expressed similar sentiments.
Among these were Arthur J. Dommen (United Press International),
Jack Foisie (Los Angles Times) and George MacArthur·.

David

Lawrence alone _remained a proponent of itfight-to-win-orelse" policy, 32· but his column was carried so infre_quently
28 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 29 and
May_ 25, 1965.
29 rbid., February 12, 19, 26, March 19, 31, April;2,
and.May 15, 1965.
I
30rbid., March 9 and 30, 1965.
.I
I

\

31rbid., February 6,"March 25, and April 19, 1965 .1
32rbid., April 27, 1965.

'I
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by the paper that it was all but meaningless in the totial

I

policy structure.

When on June 8 the Johnson Administration announced
its policy to authorize ~e use of American combat troqps
as units in battle this decision evoked prolonged and ~mphatic negative reactions from both. the Courier~Journa~ and

i

its syndicated writers.

In June alone, the paper's staff
· d"ff
. . 33 At
condemned this action on six
i erent occasions.
these times the staff expressed concern that Vietnam wru ld
become an American war, that South Vietnam was fast becoming
an American satellite, and that Johnson was pushing the
situation close to the brink of World War III.

The paper

condemned the use of American ground troops and lamented
that there could be no end to this sort of
lation."

11

creeping esca-

Johnson, the paper held, should fight until

autumn without further escalation, then offer negotiati;ons
from a strong position·.

Similar condemnation and re com.
34
.mendations also came from Walter Lippmann
and John
Averill of the Los An~les· Times. 35 Thus the Courier-Journal
in-June, 1965, had clearly made its final break with Johnson
over Vietnam.

Never again would the paper support him on

this issue.
Barry Bingham explained it this way:

J

33 rbid., June 10, 11, 12,
18, 20, and 21; 1965.
34Ibid., June 23, 1965.

'

I
I

. I

35rbid. , June 18, 19.65.

''

.

i

.It was on Mr. Johnson's conduct of our operations
in Southeast Asia that,we became increasingly criti9al.
I would like to point out; h·owever, that there were I
frequent editorials in which we made a direct appeat
to Mr. Johnson to alter some of his positions, to
cease bombing raids, to seek a ceasefire, to attempt
a major rally of world opinion around a truce in
Vietnam. In other words, we did not simply attack!
him when we thought his policies were going astray.!
We tried to reason with him, on the constant assump~
tion that he was a sane, patriotic, and humane man,
though a strong-willed and ambitious one.36
The continued escalation during the summer (troop
strength in Vietnam grew from 75,000 t? 125,000) brought
further condemnation of the Johns?n Vietnam policy.

Walter

Lippmann, citing unrealistic war aims as a cause, predicted
a ten to twelve year war. 3 7

Tom Wicker drew much the si3ffie

concl~sion, 38 while Hanson Baldwin predicted that the
escalation would not stop with the most recent 50,000
increase. 39 Moreover, Lippmann maintained that, 11 we are
now in sight of a total war. 1140

Even James Reston in an

Augu~t series warned that the all important p9litical
aspects of the war we~e fading from the public view, hidden
by the p.uge military build-up. 41 The paper itself, as is
cle·arly shown by editorials on such varied dates as January
17., April 29, and August 31 as well as cartoons on May 25,

36 ~tter from Barry Bingham, Sr., August 10, 1970.
· 37The Courier-Journal (Louisville),. July 17, 1965.
38 rbid.; July 10 and 25, 1965 •
.

--

39 Ibid., July 29, 1965.
40. Ibid., July 23, 19-65.
41 Ibid., August 5, 15, 24 and ·27, 1965.

.--.

June l and June 26, 1965, supported all of these ideas
through either editorials or editorial cartoons in the
second half of 1965 and added to them an oft-repeated plea

. .

.

I.

for initiation of .negotiations. _As Mr. Bingham pointed out;
..
.. .
I
the paper offered real alternatives to the Johnson program ·
and counseled reason and caution.in_ dealing with the vJetnam
problem.

Most of all it criticized Johnson's apparent

unwillingness to deal with Vietnam as a many-faced_problem
'

requiring a complex solution rather than a simple expedient
'
Neither the Courier-Journai nor its syndicated

solution.

columnists made any immediate comment concerning the cJristmas
1

· bombing halt, since short truces, particularly on holic(ays,
were by now old hat and the paper apparently saw this one as
doing little to terminate the struggle.
I

A further indication that the Courier-Journal had'.
.

.

.

.

9

.

.

I

achieved a complete reversal of its l 54 stance occurred

.

.

I

when, ori several occasions, it voiced support .of the ve;ry
. I
Geneva accords which.it had termed ari "Asian Munich" inl 1954.
'
'I .
Though it offered no explanation for.this stance, perhaps
.

.

I.

they felt the accords offered the only possible and remotely
.

.

!

feasible way out of what.it now considered a "Vietnam m$ss."
Moreover, the paper appealed for negotiations and condemned
increased intervention in 1965, ·whereas it had taken the
opposite position in 1954.
in causing this 'change.

Several factors were instrtkntal

The ~hift from the philosophy tf

Mark Ethridge to that of Barry Bingham was complete by 1965,

.I

· and the editorial page had come to reflect the more liberal
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anti-interventionist policies of Bingham.

Bingham had also

acquired the staff necessary to 'implement this change.

In

1959 cartoonist, Hugh Haynie, ha<:l joined the paper and by
1965 had clearly become an anti-war voice on the staffr
C_onse_rvati ve Russel Briney would soon_ be displaced as. \
editorial page editor ·by more liberal _and anti·;-war editor,
Molly Clowes, and the main pro-war voice, Weldon James'j .was
being heard less.

Indeed, James would for this reason soon

leave the paper.

The only new writer, William Peepies,' had.
been added in 1961 and he was definitely not pro-war. 42
•

•

•

•

I

As early as 1963, the paper had shown some opposition
to American involvement in Vietnam.

This opposition ha 'd
1

.

grown through 1964, ~nd in 1965 President Johnson's decision
I

to use American combat troops had released its full vengeance.
I
By 1965 also, the growing size and co·st of· the war as well

I

as its seemingly interminal nature made it much harder for
.
I ·• .
even a moderate to.support than in 1962, 1963,.or even 1964.
I.

Consequently the'Courier-Jou:rnal, by now a• liberal papet,'
I
•

did not support the war in 1965.
action was the rule of the day~

,I

Condemnation of our _m~li tary
I

'
'.
I

i .
I

,

i

'
,·
i

4·2During the entire 1961-1969 period, Peeples did hot
. e!Dlter a signed editorial. It is thus difficult to judge his
bias.

I

·'.

CHAPTER V
JOHNSON'S POLITICAL DEMISE
During 1966, the Courier-Journal expanded upon its·
.

.

1·

'

· i965 position of opposition to the Johnson Vietnam policy.
,

•

•

•

I

Although the bombing halt of_December 24, 1965 to Jan~ry
31, 1966, found

Courier-Journal reaction late in comi~g,
I

the editors emphatically favored: exten~i~nof the halt las
1
a step toward peace.
Lippmann, _however, felt that th1 ·
'
bombing halt or any talks which might result from it hlid
little chance of bringing peace. 2 On the other hand,
'

James Reston wrote that in calling the bombing halt,
President Johnson was making a genuine move for peace~jand
in this the Courier-Journal staff_ agreed.

.

Reston argu·ed

.

I.

that fear of Red Chinese intervention elsewhere in Asia and
.
.
I .
a desire on the part of the U¢ted States
to
put
up·a
!,old
.
.
.•

.

front to deter it was stifling peace negotiations
·when :the
,
I
•
possibility of such intervention was so. remote that--_it i ·
should be discounted. 3 In this also the Courier:.Journal
'

I

I .. ·

staff concurred.

Therefo·re -editorially, the Courier-Journal
'
and the New York Times. spoke on the issue as _one voice.I·
.1The Courier-Journal (Louisville), January 25~ 19166,·
2rbid., January 26, 1966.
3 rbid., January 6, 1966,
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!
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I

I

With the resumption of the bombing in February, the

.

.I

paper again expressed fear of a wider ' war and discouragement
'

with Johnson's policy which it felt was far too escalationist.
As a result of President Johnson's Honolulu conference 'with
I

South Vietnamese Premier Vice Air Karshall Nugyen Cao Ky,
both the staff and pundit Walter Lippmann viewed him eJerging
as a

11

Super Hawk.

I, .

.

'I

11

To.both Lippmann and the st,l'lff, the

conference appeared a total victory for the militant point
of view expounded by Ky. 4 Koreover, according to syndicated
writer Chalmers Roberts, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, not
normally dogmatic, was beg~nning to sound more and mor~ like
·former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; a dogmati'c
anti-Communist militant. 5 The paper seemed to agree and
held that the time to have that sort of static policy had
clearly passed.

A flexible policy would be more suitaqle

for the situation then existing.

Just what should cons1titute

such a flexible policy the paper'did not say.

..,

4 rbid., February 9 and 'il, 1966. Nguyen Cao Key·who
came to power in South Vietnam on June 19, 1965 was an expatriate of North Vietnam. He was born in 1930 to "middle
class parents near Hanoi and educated in various military
schools in Vietnam, France, North Africa, and the United .
States. An obscure air force officer until the sixties, Ky
first-achieved importance as a member of the ruling military
Junta (1963-65) and as Vice Air Karshall. In·l965 he became
Premier, a post he held until 1967. During his tenure in
office he faced several near revolts from Buddh:is::s and army
officers •. Partly responsible for this was his militant
attitude and his favoritism toward fellow former northerners.
He was a strong believer in bombing and in carrying_ the:[ war
to North Vietnam. He was for this reason supported by the ..
Johnson Administration but not nearly so popular at horrle.
In 1968 he became· Vice President of South Vietnam, a c~nsiderably less powerful position.
·
5Ibid., April 2, 1966.
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This reversal of editorial policy by the Courier~
Journal had become too repulsive to a~ least one of its·
editorial writers, Weldon James, a reserve Marine colonel.
I

He resigned his position as associate editor of the ed\torial
page on April 14, in opposition to the paperrs.dovelikJ
posit.ion on Vietnam.

He held the view. that it was rrpaJt time
6

to say the hell with Ho,rr

,1

•

and so strong were his convictions

that he volunteered for duty with the Marine Corps in
Vietnam.

Following James 1 s departure, the staff adhered

to its new policy even more closely.

Subsequently, there-

fore, during June the pape~ and all of its .syndicated ,
writers voiced opposition to the possible election·of

hawk11
Ky in the upcoming presidential elections in South Vietnam. 7
The paper seemed obligated to oppose Ky.

11

His power base

was military, while since April· 196_5 · the paper had advo·cated
an economic approach to the Vietnam problem.· Moreover he
represented the

11

Catholic Ruling· Class"_ which. the paper had

opposed since 19.63, as.well as the policy of mi-litary
victory through escala.tion.
unacceptable. 8

In short, Ky was totally

In line ¢.th the Ky-Johnson war philosophy American·
bombers stepped up their _activity;

The· initial Ame.rican · ,•

6rbid., April 15, 1966.
7Ibid., May 10, 11, 17, June ·1,= and August 25, 19.66 •.
.8
.
. I'
Dennis Blo_odworth, An Eye For the Dragon (New York:
Farrar, 1970), p. 220. Claimed of· Ky·and Thieu. 11 Palace! for
Palace, torture for torture, victory for victory, they were
different, only they were the same. rr. He was comparing 'the_m
to Diem. In essence the paper agreed.
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bombing-of installations around the Hanoi-Haiphong area in
.

'I

late·June, resulted in an unfavorable reaction from the.
9
10
:
Courier-Journal.
In addition, Reston -and Gavin Young
(London·observer) 11 criticized .the bombing as both danJerous
and ineffective.
During the remainder of July, as more American airmen
. Nort,
h th e treatment of prisoners
.
I
were shot down• over the
I
i

and concern about escalation were the.main topics of Courier'

.

Journal _Vietnam comment.

'

.

The paP.er pleaded for reciprqcal

humarie treatment of prisoners and moderation in the inter'I
rogation of Viet C.ong suspects. 12 It also reiterated the
by'

now.coinmon fear of escalation, as did its ~yndicated
columnists. 13 · Now the paper clearly viewed the war as

I
,.

inhumane and as such opposed it and its dehumanizing as:pects.

I

· ·, During the remainder of the year as one peace feeler
I

I

afte~. another failed, these failures were reflected in l~he
paper.

.

Occasional cr~ticism of the lack of a Johnson piace

offensiye was also noted.

Clearly the paper felt, as iit
'
expressed in its reactions to his June 8, 1965 speech, in
· which he had made public authorization to use. American ~roops

as gro~nd ~ombat units, that Johnson should .attempt to
.!

I

. 9The Courier-Journal (Louisville), July l and 4, t966 •.
lO~bid., July 7, 1966.
11 rbid., July 8, 1966.
12rbid., July 19; 26,'--and August 8, 1966.
13rbid. , July 20, 21, _and 27, 1966.

'
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initiate negotiations with the North Vietnamese- and possibly
wi th the Viet Cong.

1-

His alleged failure to do so constituted
i

a major cause of the paper's opposition to_ his adminis_,ration;
Perhaps the paper expected' too much from President Johlson,
The staff .certainly gave him little credi"t for any attempts

he made at peace feelers and frequently criticized his·
supposed lack of effort.

Apparently the paper never topk
'

'

the possibility of reluctance from the North Vietnamese: and
'
Viet Cong into account. The paper simply concluded th~t
the entire blame. for repeated failure of peace feelers;
rested with Johnson.

I

The paper's dislike of Johnson may
!

well have clouded its vision on this point,

\ .

A Papal plea for negotiations failed in September:.

A

SEATO conference in Manila in October showed similar

-results.

I

Later that month, almo.st everyone (Thant, Johnson,

DeGaulle, and Wilson) appeared to be talking peace, but the
Vietnamese, both North and South, did not appear-to be
'listening.

I

In reaction, the Courier-Journal staff expressed
i

sorrow at the failure of these efforts, but still advoc¥tted
attempts at negotiations~ 14 Having discarded the milit~ry
possibilities, ·the paper could only hope now for a diplomatic
'

solution and took every chance to promote· the ide·a.

'

Once
'

more the paper p~t f~rth its theory that economic development
.
'

-

I

.

I

was the key ·to peace and that a concerted determined effort
should be made by the Johnson Administration to initiati

I
14rbid., September 7', 21, and October 22, 1966.
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negotiations toward ending -the war. 15

By. November, .bo·tJ

Restori and the Courier-Journal staff were predicting th~.
·triumph of Johnson's war critics at the polls as a resu:z!t of ·
the .failure· of the October peace efforts • 16 ·
The Christmas season recorded a. bombing halt of nimetysix hours, and in response to this event, the staff ask1ld
why·a longer nalt should not be just as acceptable and
perhaps more effective. 17 Indeed, the.Courier-Journal 9nce more
raised the question, nWhy half steP.s to peace? 11

·

The editorial

page se.emed. to expound the idea that the presidential pJace
moves were'more formality than sincere effort.

It therJfore
!

·condemned these efforts as such and furth~r opposed Joh~son 1 s
Vietnam policy·as incoherent and misdirected.

Here again
i

the paper became less than objective in its criticism o~
i

. Johnson and_ perhaps underestimated his desire for peace.:
I'

•

The P?per tended to blame Johnson not the Viet Cong or North
Viet~amese for the Vie~nam sit~ation.

Syndica~ed colum~ist
Joseph Kraft expressed hope for a long bombing halt, 18
·white· the staff' added their hopes that' peace itself wou~d
develop out of .a Christmas truce. 19
I

. It;i·· summary it seemed that more changes .had occurr~d
in
I

.,

tsriiid., September 7 and 8, i966.
l6rb{d., November 1 and 3, 1966 •.
~

l.7Ibid., December 1, 1966.
18rbid., December 11 ;-, 1966.
19rbid., December 16 and 28, 1966.
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the Courier-Journal staff than in the Vietnam situation
I

during 1966,

'

Basically the paper continued to advocate

~gotiation and to criticize those who proposed more militant·
measures.

Moreover, its syndicated writers supported ·s,imilar

policies.

The anti-involvement policy of the paper was

'

1

"facilitated by the angry resignation of Weldon James, Jnd
-

I

the February death of Russel Briney, (the moderate editorial
page editor since 1948, who was replaced by pacifist Molly
Clowes).

General staff disillusionment with the situation

in.Vietnam was an important fac~or in generating the paper's
I

criticism.

I

As Bingham himself put it:

I

Granting that the editorial position of the CourierJournal has become increasingly critical of our
involvement in Southeast Asia since 1966, I submit
that such change as has occurred is a reflection of
the editorial staff's growing disillusionment with the
turn of events there, and our unhappy conviction that
the United States is losing men, money, and international influence in the process,20
The now well-established anti-war policy of the
Courier-Journal continued throughout 1967,

In the early

months, the paper viewed qimly the possibility of peace~
Among its syndicated columnists, Chalmers Roberts compared
Vietnam i~ 1966. to the Indian wars of the last century;
endless attrition and expense with no worthwhile or ~ttainable objectives. 21 Joseph Kraft accused Johnson of _being
afraid to oppose -the military in seeking peace, 22 an opinion

201etter to the Author, August 10, 1970,
21The Courier-Jo~rnal· (Louisville), January 1,
2 2rbid., January 3, 1967.
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I
I

in which Lippmann concurr~d.23

I
I

Another syndicated writer,

Jack Foisie, anticipated no change in the status of the war
in the foreseeable future. 24 Despite its anti-war policy,
the paper voiced no objection to the Iron Triangle offensive

..

.

'

i

(January 8-27)--a relatively successful search and ftes~roy
. sweep conducted by the Americans_ and South Vietnamese--\the
largest of the war.

It did, however, oppose continuation

of the bombing of North Vietnam, as did both Kraft and •
Lippmann. 25

The paper obviously felt that this was detri-

me-q.ta1· to the possible initiation of negotiations which: it
supported and that bombing the North could never force the

I

Communists to capitulate.

Rather it would, as the Luftwaffe

bombing of London had done, unite them in the determination
not to be bullied into submission.

The paper fel;, there-

fore, that Johnson was making a major error ih his bombing
policy and that emotion here colored his judgment.

I .

· Whe~ from february 8 to the 12 a lunar new year tJ;Uce
·was observed, the·courier-Journal staff saw in it a possible
gatE)way ·to -a permanent cessation of hostilities. 26 Johnson
.should,_ it neld, unilaterally offer to extend this truce
·in_defini tely i _thus in effect creati,ng a unilateral ceasefi·1:'e·. 2 7°· But no such development occurred. · Still hoping

2 3 ~ .. ·January 4, 1967.
'24:r::bid., January 8, 1967.
25 rbid., January 11, ,.1.8, 19, and February 1, 1967.

26The Courier-Jo~rnal (Louisville), February 8, 9,,and
11,.· 1967,
I

2 7rbid,, February 12, 1967.
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for peace, the paper late that same month and in early I
l

March 'joined its syndicated writers in calling for a

'

.

l

bombing halt •. On February 16, the paper made a plea for
negotiations.

.

It discounted the possible risks of sucHI .

talks and concluded ~in the view of this newspaper, holJever,

all these risks are less great than- a continued plunge

.

along the slippery path of war on.the Asian continent.~
Nearly a month later, a staff editorial proposed that
President Johnson stop bombing the North as a gesture of
'

peace· which involved no risks t~ South Vietnam.

I

A word

I

from him, the paper held, could remove the only block to
'
.
I
28
peace. talks.
Neither of. these attempts bore any fruitt.
'

.

Consequently the paper's criticism of Johnson deepened.
This criticism became even more evident as a result
i
of the war strategy meeting between South Vietnam's
Premier Ky and President Johnson which took place on Ma~ch
.
·,
I
20-21 at Guam. In evaluating the effects of the conference,
.
, I
,the Courier-Journal predicted a triumph of the hawk polf cy and
escalation of.the war. 29 · Since both Johnson and Ky' wer~ men
totally committed to the.military solution, the paper _

1

seemingly·could reach no other conclusion.

At this point
•

I

i

the Courier-Journal strangely omitted making note. of' the
.

.

•

I

'

new South Vietna~ese _constitution of March 19 which· pro[
vided for a bicameral legislature, a president, and vice
28 rbid., February 16 and 27, 1967.
29rbid., M'arch 30, 1967.

I

.
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president as well as elections the following year.

The

paper perhaps saw little of importance in the constitution
itself and w9uld reserve judgment until it was implemented
through nationwide elections in the fall.

The Courier-,

Journal staff, though not ready to give up the cause, slaw
little chance that this document would radically change the
government of South Vietnam.

Military-oriented government,

its excesses, its abuses and its attitudes would remain
largely unchanged.
Once more expressing its di-sappointment, the paperconcluded that the April United Nations peace plan had
30
failed,
In this plan, Secretary-General U Thant had
proposed a unilateral United States ceasefire as a first
step toward peace.
did Hanoi,

Washington had no official reaction, nor

This lack of response on Johnson's part, the

paper held, doomed the effort,

The paper made no mention

of a similar failure to respond on Hanoi's part,

It was a

repetition of the lunar new year proposal.
Throughout May, the staff noted the ill effects of
Vie_tnam involvement. on domestic affairs,

Because of Vietnam,

the paper held, funds for the Great Society and other
domestic social programs were in short supply,31 ·The editors
also mentioned the loss of American military flexibility,
The United States was tied down in Vietnam, and this lack of

30rbid,, March 30,- 1967.
31rbid,, May 7, 1967,
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flexibility, the paper held, could be highly dangerous to
the United States position in ·world affairs • 32
.

•

I

In June the staff occupied i_tself with opposi tioli to
the Ky candidacy for President33 and in July with fear\of
escalation. 34 This escalation was soon forthcoming. ien
.
I
on July 13_, a 50,000 troop increase was authorized, the
staff opposed this action and all other such increases~ yet
I

foresaw further escalation since it believed such escal'ation
to be an integral part of the Johnsonian war plan. 35_
Tio

attempt to offset the escalation, the paper in August increased
!

its .appeals for a negotiated settlement.
In February, 1968, the Senate Foreign Relations Com.
I
mittee began hearings on the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions,
and by July its work had commanded the attention of the
Courier-Journal.

Critics of the Vietnam Conflict charged
..
.
.
.
.
I
the incident which had prompted passage of the Resolution

had not been accurately reported.. Several Se~ators cl·aJmed:,
that United States.destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy had not
been fired on by North Vietnamese torpedo boats as clainied
!

and presented Navy documents listing. no. damage to the. ·sh'ips.
I
.
'.

.

as evidence •. To counter these allegations iri closed ·hef!;ri~gs
•

•

•

I

Sec-retary of Defense Robert McNamara mai_ntained that- the'I
\

3 2Ibid., May 21, 1967.
33rbid., June 15 and July 1, 1967.
34rbid
.
., July 7, 9, 14, 16, and 25, 1967 •

__

_.,

35rbid

July 16, 1967.
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'
destroyers had indeed been deliberately attacked and that

retaliation as authorized by the Resolution was indeed
justified.

The results of the hearings were a decline:in

.

I

the- credibility of the Johnson Administration pronouncements

I

on the status of the war and eventual repeal of the Resolu-

.

· tion.

I

In consequence the paper concluded that the 196~

escalation resulting from the Resolution had not been based
on actual enemy aggression, but rather on a falsified
report. 36 To support this position a special report by
1

Anthony Howard. (London Observer) was given space on the
opposite editorial page.

~oward wrote that owing to the

Tonkin Gulf debates the doves had gained- the initiative in
Congress·.3 7
Late August saw the Courier-Journal directing its
criticism .at another phase of the Vietnamese situation,
i .
contending that the elections_ in the South were a hoax. 38
.

.

I

In particular, the staff deplored the campaign techniq~es
of the·milit_ary candidates Ky and Thieu. 39 In this Tom
Wi~ker agr_eed.· 4o As a ~esult of this and earlier discouragements about Vietnam, the paper began once more to
.

.

:

.

i;;_eriously · question the worth of tli.e. American role there.
The- staff concluded that• Vietnam was not worth its
36 .
. Ibid., July 18, 1967.
37tbid., August 6, 1967. ·
.....
38Ibid., August 14, 1967.
39Ibid., August 17, 1967.
40Ibid., August 22, 196 7.
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cost to date.

41

The natiopal columnists were in agreement
.

!

.

· and Tom Wi.cker asked, "Even if the war is right in prin~iple
.
·
·
42
I
can these terrible costs be decently borne?" . He answered
his own query in the negative.

Joseph Kraft contendedj

"We will still be paying (for) it years after the uglyjlittle
wa"r is only a bad memory.1t 43

M"oreover, Reston wrote tat

.

'I

'

even conservative Republican Senator ·Everett Dirksen of
.
.
rllinois had come to doubt American war. aims.44 These

1

•

I

expressions of opinion led the paper to conclude inNoiember
that President Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humph~ey
had become political casualties of the former' s war eff:ort. 45
Though traditionally Democrat, the paper did not· mourn i
their passing.
rn 1968 as in the two previous years,· the Courier.Journal continued to follow an anti-~ar, anti-Johnson, ahd
pro-negotiation policy.

Despite· the s·eemingiy incessa~~

.

.

I

.. ,

calls for peace through negotiations, the prospect for ~uch
,·

'
was dim and the Courier-Journal selected the Saigon govern-'
'

•

I

ment to bear the burden of guilt. 'The st~ff ·now s·~w. the
militancy of the Saigon government and· not the opposition ·
.

41 r:bid., August 29, -1967 •.
42 rbici., August
26, 1967.
43 rbid., August 27,
1967.
44 ri,id., Octo.ber 8,
1967 •
.
. 45 rbid., November 19,' 1967.

-

-

'

.
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of President Johnson as tqe primary block to peace 46 and
.
I
columnist Joseph Kraft agreed that peace was far remov~d. 47

I

Perhaps the paper's traditional pro.:.Democrat stance motivated it to shift the blame away from the Johnson AdmiJistration in a presidential election_ year.

·Such a mo.ve 1ould

permit the paper to more easily support the Pemocratic. \
caqdidate Hubert Humphrey •. rt is also possible that tqe
.

.

'

militant stance on the Ky government and the overbearing
.
:
personality of Ky himself prompted the shift. :
. The Communist assaults on Hue, Saigon and other m'ajor

.

.

.

I

cities of January 30 to Feb_ruary 25 known as the Tet (1 nar

1

new year) offensive diminished hope for peace even further •

. . ·.

I

In this
rather.
successful series of assaults, the Communists
'
.
.
!

for a time captured Hue, threatened DaNang and disrupted
traffic to and from Saigon.

The resulting shock at the\
I
I

relatively easy and unexpected Communist successes brought

•

'

about· the. questi_oning by the paper of American war aims J
the pacification of the country side, and the ~ffective4ess
of .t;he_ Vietnamese A~y, 48

Thus the pape_r 1 s editorial c7

.for negotiation became even louder and it concluded that the
Vietnam ·war wa_s · clearly a detriment; to many aspects of
.

.

•

I

',

r
I

American life (i.e. war on poverty, urban renewal, educS:tion,
etc.),· As such,- it should be ended by whatever means

4 6rbid,, January 17, 1968.
47rbid,, January 24 a,nc;! February 21, 1968,
48Ibid,, February 8, 1968,
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possibie.49

Subsequent t6 T~t,. the paper had concluded·

. I

..-(and Kraft and Reston agreed) that the United States was
really only half-heartedly serious about pursuing peacl
tal~s.

rt further cited the April 11 call--up of rese,ists

as evidence of this fact.SO

President Johnson was·also

.excoriated for talking peace on·the-one hand while prebaring
i

for further escalation
on the other •.
..
Despite_its previous admonitions· concerning Amer~can
.

,

I .

seriousness, the paper praised the Kay 13 beginning of Ithe
. Parl s Peace Talks.

..

I

Kraft and Lippmann as well as the staff
51.

counseled patience as to their progress.
American negotiating team of Averill

I

Both praised \the.

Harriman and Cyrt.ts
I

The Courier-Journal staff, however, proved impatient,

Vance.

for as early as May 15,. the editorial page began to exp,ress
. j

impatience_with the apparent lack of progress and true
nego~iating spirit.
Perhaps the paper never really believed that the jtalks
would r,,ipidly lead to a Southeast Asian settlement.

Ev~n
I

be:l:ore the talks had officially opened the paper had concluded,
I
I

11

Th~·circumstances surrounding this guarded advance towfrd
'

th!:! - pea;ce table warn that for the inoment caution may be i the
,.

.

bet;:ter pa-r:t .of cel~bration, 11

.

,I

On the same day the paper1

i
49 rbid., February 11, 18, 19, and 26, 1968.
50rbid., April .12, 1968 •.
51The Courier-Journat·(Louisville), May 12, 15, 1,
and· 18, 1968.

found reason for both hope and discouragement in yet another·
facet of the preliminary talks.
•

\

It contended that:

.

I

._acceptance of the French,government's offer of
Paris as a site for preliminary talks is evidence
that both nations--the United States and North ·: · ·
Vietnam were the only participants at this time--a1e
looking for a way out of the war. But the fact that
it has taken them a month to agree even to meet to!
talk about talks is also evidence of the tremendous
difficulties that lie ahead for the negotiations.5~
~

I·

'

The paper's faith in the long-awaited talks wane4 even
further owing to the Battle of Saigon (June 3-15) and heavy
.
July increases in American casualties. 53 These things i
.

seemed to prove the enemy's unwillingness to negotiate.
The paper already knew of Johnson's reluctance.

Final]y
I

the paper was willing to admit that the blame for the

I

failure of peace feelers might not always lay with J ohJson
'
'

or Saigon, that there were two sides to be considered; :that
'

I

the Viet Cong or North- Vietnamese might be the reluctant,
ones.
The final blow to whatever hope the paper might s1till
'.

have held for peace in 1968 came with the announcement ;that
I

during August American forces had been increased to 5411,000.
'
The staff lamented this new es.calation, blamed Johnson and

'

concluded that the "hawk" image engendered by it wo~ld ~emain

.

l

to curse Democratic Presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey
. I
i .
in the November elections. 5 4

1
52rbid., May 4, 1968.
53rbid., June 5,'1968.
54rbid., June 18, 1968.

.
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.The Courier-Journal made little mention of Vietnam as
'

I,

an issue in the 1968 Presidential election.

Perhaps t~is

was true because the paper saw lit~le difference in thJ
Vietnam views of the two major candidates Democrat HubJrt
Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon,. Perhaps it was Ialso
1
I

true because the paper felt that neither candidate offered
a true alternative to the Johnson policy,

As early as

1

March 15 and 18, the paper claimed that Nixon was but an
echo of Johnson on Vietnam, 55 In July the paper saw hi~ as
a sphinx on Vietnam and as late as October 3, referred :to
him as an 11 artful dodger" on Vietnamese questions. 56 The
paper seemingly felt that Humphrey was permanently tied
to Johnson 1 s Vietnam·policies.

No matter how he tried to

escape the association, he would always be linked in the
public eye, with Johnson on Vietnam.s·7

Thus the paper_.

apparently felt that neither candidate offered a different.
course in Vietnam and consequently spent little time commenting on the view of either .• .
On November 1, President Johnson initiated a.limited

bombing halt . and, despite its apprehensions about the,
'

.

'

political overtones of the ban, the Courier-Journal ·supported
it as a move toward peace. 58 In December, the paper

55rbid., March 15 and 18, 1968.
56 rbid,, July 19 and October 3, 1968.

.-

1968.

_· I
57Ibid., June 18, September 12, and 14, and October 1,
58rbid,, November 2, 1968.

\.

I

.
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·reiterated its earlier conclusion that the Saigon gove1rnment
i

was a liability and not an asset in the·Paris peace talks,
or on the battlefield. 59 Joseph Kraft again agreed. 60 ; ·
•

I

Further concluding that the myopia of the United Stateb
Embassy in Saigon was responsible for much of the distlrted

.

I

news coming from war zone, as for
many tactical blunders,
•
I
61
the paper en~ouraged the Embassy's reo~ganization.
+t
recommended the replacement of older embassy personnel, in
the hope that new men would bring new ideas and not be
fossilized by yesterday's mistakes.
Thus in 1968 the paper's hopes for peace were lifted
by the Paris peace talks only to be dashed by insufficient
progress there and further escalation of the war.

This

disappointment deepened the paper's bitterness toward
_Joh~son and the Saigon government, leading it to open and
frequent criticism of both.

In 1968, the paper reached,
-

I

both.its _depth of despair about the war, and its height of
criticism of Johnson and Saigon.

Yet, its main concern

was. peace.,. _and :it s·till praised anyone, even Johnson during
. the Novembe·r bombing halt, who openly sought peace by any
·means •. · Though ·it criticized Joht}son, tre paper did not
'

openly·malign him but rather, as Bingham maintains:

1968.

59lli£., November 12, 14, 28, 30, December 2 and 18,
60rbid., December 2, 1968;

....

6lrbid., December 20, 1968.

:I
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· .Our criticisms of Johnson's policy were. based on
. developments that occurred during his administration,
at points when we felt that he was making unwise ; .
decisions.62
,
I

In 1969 ~ the Johnson Administration ended as a tbtal ·
disappointment to the paper.

I

Still the editor held out hope

.

for the .future Nixon Administration 1 s policy on Vi~tnaih. 63 ·

.

.

I

'Kraft praised Nixon's realisti•c approach to peace, as did the

.

..

staff. 6 4

-

I

Both expressed hope for.a rapid end to the w*r. 65

I
! .

6 2Letter to 'the author, August 10, 1970.
1969.

63 The Courier-Journal (Louisville), January 7 and 8,

...
64rbid,, February 2, 1969.
6Slli.£., February 1, 1969.

.
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CHAPIER VI

THE CONCLUSIONS
In fifteen years the Courier-Journal transformed
itself from a conservative interventionist stance on Indo1

China to a position of anti-involvement.

It changed from.a

I

1954 proponent of American airstrikes into Indo-China to a
1969 opponent of the same tactic.

I
This change became appar-

·ent in the paper's disenchantment with Lyndon Johnson's
handling of the. war.

The cost of the war·under Johnson
1

became too high in lives and in dollars.

No.attack had!

I

been. made on American territory and the nation's security
was clearly not in jeopardy.
a war·on such a scale.

No justification existed for.

..

I.
I
that instance clear war
I
hos_tili ties jus tifieq.

World War II had been much larger

·- and many times more costly, but in
aims could .be. shown· aI).d causes for

I

_While the paper could support small low.:cos t efforts by
·~·

i
I

-the-United States to maintain a pro-western balance of

I
I

power o~ers'eas, it could not justify or even condone su~h
massive intervention as Vietnam·had become by 1969.

If

Vietnam had remained small and limited in :scope.as the
Lebanon ·intervention of 1958 or of short duration as the
Dominic.an Republi6 interve~tion ·of. 1965, it ~ight well Jave
maintained Courier-Jou~al '"~ditorial support.

Had it belgun,

as.did World War II, as a defense of American territory the
78

.
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paper might have justified its continuance as necessary to
national security.

'
Lacking all of these attributes, h9wever,

the Vietnam war rapidly lost the paper's support and earned
!

its opposition.

Compounding earlier problems of foggy war

aims, improper methods and failure to justify American
commitment to the press and the people, Vietnam became an
American war in Asia with vast manpower commitments.

The

idea of such a war had never been popular in the United
States.

When, in the 1930 1 s, Japan had attacked China the

nation sympathized with the Nat~onalist Chinese government
but sent no troops.

The United States declined to commit

troops to aid the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists
in 1945-1948 and as a consequence saw China

11 go

Communist. 11

rndeed the Truman administration recoiled from the idea of
sending troops into China during the Korean Conflict even
for protective reaction.

Land war in Asia was clearly'

repugnant to many Americans.

The Courier-Journal saw

massive involvement in Vietnam as just such a war and opposed
i.t.

After 1965, the paper could no longer countenance the

gro_wing Americ8:n commitments to Vietnam or the combat
casualties which went with them, and would not rationalize
them with patriotic cliches.

rn addition, a concerned

paper could not overlook the many examples of American
burigling of the war effort, and needless waste of lives!and
money.

rn view of these facts the paper concluded that

South Vietnam was not worth the price.
price i~deed seemed high. ·

To the paper the

I
I

''
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By 1969, not only were casualties already in excess of

I

the Korean Conflict, but the war had created ·a huge rift in
•

American society.

I

Open conflict occurred between "the

I

j

establishment" which supported the war and those who oplposed
it.

Conscription had become repugnant to many _young Americans

bring~ng draft evasion and desertion to all-time highs.!
American society as wel_l as world opinion was sgocked ait .
I

American abuses and excesses in the conduct of the war.

As

a result American prestige suffered a tremendous blow.

All

· of this, the paper concluded, negated any value success in
•

Vietnam might hold.

I

The paper reached these conclusions in

1965, and thereafter voiced them with increasing frequehcy.
Perhaps as important as its disenchantment with
Johnson was the paper's dislike of the chronic corruption
· and instability of the governments in Saigon.

Assis ting

such governments, much less fighting for their survival,
I

seemed to have little merit.

In turn the paper had con~

demned Diem, Khanh, Ky, and Thieu for much.the same fau:J_ts.
None of these men had carried'out a program of land re-·
.

.

.

distribution, seriously attempted to democratize their
regimes, or eliminated a significant amount of the corruption
in South·Vietnam 1 s government or military.

The paper's

lack of faith in "Vietnamese Democracy,." often exhibited
through cartoonist Hugh Haynie, became most vehement as .the
fall of 1967 Presidential elections in Vietnam neared.
Haynie.depicted the ruling military Junta as a tank cru hing
civilian candidates and titled his ca;toon !!Political

81

Steamroller." 1

On other occasions Haynie portrayed Ky and

Thieu as a two-headed monster and .the·Saigon government as

.

. .

.

I

a puppet controlling its supposed operator·nuncle Sugar."
The editorial staff had little faith in the effectivenlss, •
.
I
democracy, and popular support of such a government. I.is
dislike had begun with Diem and continued to its deepest
·1

point with Ky and Thieu.
What the paper failed to understand was the true,

'

· nature of the political situation in South Vietnam •. Never
.

I

had the Vietnamese had a Western democratic background jnor
Western style civil rights.
.

Perhaps application of the1se

.

.

.

I'

.

concepts was not even desirable or possible in Southeas:t

Asia.

Perhaps Communism would not have been wrong for!

South Vietnam.

Compounding this error, the paper over-:

simplified the role of Ho Chi Minh.· He was not simply ~n
appendage of world Conmunism, but rather an independent
force.

He was the- most significant "nationalist leader of

I. .

the Vietnamese people •. His forces had struggled .for a

..

long time to free Vietnam of French rule _and were certainly
not about to place themselves under Chinese control.
.

I

. I

While the paper was probably_ qui t_e ·correct in_·i ts

I·

dislike and criticism of South Vietnamese leaders from Diem
to Thieu it overlooked the deeper reasons for their
unpopularity.

Their's were not locally supported govern-

I

ments but rather extensions of the desires of two outside

.1lThe Courier-Journal (Louisville), August 17, 196i.
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· powers,· either France or t,he United States.

Thus much of

the criticism offered by the Courier-Journal was misdirected
i

and the po.ssible result of a poorly informed editorialistafE.
Furthermore, the paper became disillusioned by tJe
.
I
seemingly endless nature of the war. rt was perfec.tly I
I

'I

willing to support one-shot airstrike intervention in 1954,
i

or .even the Tonkin retaliation of 1964, but not years
attritional war.

df

Endless commitment to Vietnam seemed to

the paper a misallocation of military and monetary resources.
Vietnain had become a war with no visible progress.

There

were no static front lines, no clearly defined strategic
objectives, and no concrete goals.

Tnstead the entire i
'

.

.

'

enormous effort was directed at the nebulous end of freedom
for Vietnam, a doubtful development to begin with.

Any

-reporf of progress coming from Vietnam was subject to doubt,
Credibility declined after revelation of the untruths of.
the Tonkin affair,

The body count of Viet Cong killed was

found highly unre1iable and thus not an indication of
succ~ss, ·only Administration and Saigon government assur. anc:es. th.at vic·tory was
· 11

II

just around the corner, 11 that

another 50,000. troops would insu'I'e victoryn remained,

Repetition soon dulled the effect of these· pronouncements
and left a feeling that perhaps progress was not possible,
Th:i..s the paper· could not tolerate.

As the war grew lon~er

with no end in sight and no visible progress, the paper'
increased opposition.

...

Changes in the administration ·of the paper and in the

I

!
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composition of its editorial staff also helped account for
its change in policy.

In 1963, the paper changed handsI from
'

conservative Catholic publisher M"ark Etheridge to libet-al

.I . . . .

Barry Bingham.
inevitable.

This made a shift in editorial policy almost

It put an outspoken critic of Lyndon John1on

and American foreign involvement at"the paper's head at a
time when all segments of public opinion were beginninl to

I

turn against the war,.and when Johnson was assuming fu~l
'

responsibility for its conduct.

The paper merely went/

further and faster than public opinion in its criticism of

.

I

Johnson and Vietnam.

It was
an accurate harbinger of the
.
:
i
American mood on Vietnam. In the end, the paper and public
.·

opinion reached parallel conclusions:

.

!

that Lyndon Johnson·, s
.

/

policy on Vietnam had been wrong; that Vietnam was an
incredibly sticky mess·; and that· the United States shou"id
I

endeavor to find some quick, but honorable way out of that
mess, preferably a timetable withdrawal based on a negoj·ti· ated
settlement with North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and South
Vietnamese.

The essential difference, however, lay.in the
I

fact that the Courier-Journal reached these conclusions'
earlier, and advocated the. rapid solution of the proble~s
'

they entailed more emphatically _at an earlier date. ·Asllate
as M"arch 1966, a Gallup poll showed that 50 per cent of
tho·se interviewe_d favored Johnson's handling of the Vie nam
war, while only 33 per cent disapproved and 17 per centlgave
no opinion.

The Courier-Journal had disapproved his ha dling
I
of that situation since early 1965. Not until M"arch 1967

84
did public opinion begin the _sw~ng fully away from Johnson.

I

Even then only 49 per cent disapproved of his efforts and
37 per cent still approved.

'I

Though in 1967 the Courier-

Journal vehemently favored a halt to the bombing of Notth
Vietnam, polls showed only 15 per cent of the poputacelheld
.this view, while 63 per cent opposed such action.

2

'

Inqeed

as late as M"ay 1967, a Harris poll showed 43 per cent of the
people interviewed favored further escalation, a policy the
Courier-Journal had opposed since. 1965. 3 Thus, it is clear
that on the issue of Vietnam, the Courier-Journal, especially
after 1964, led and shaped public opinion rather than
followed and was shaped by it.

Even Barry ,Bingham, Sr.,

admits:

r would define our policy in this matter as left
of center. , • • We were affected by the continued
accumulation of evidence pointing to the futility of
·.our search for a clear-cut solution in Vietnam. The
American reliance on airpower as an instrument of i
deterrence has been sadly compromised by our experi~
ence in Southeast .Asia. We have not shown the hopeful
degree .of adaptability to the conditions of a guerrilla
war, M"r. Johnson's plans were clearly based on con~
fident.predictions made to him by.the best military
··brains at his disposal, and confirmed in many cases
by his closest civilian associates, We came to the
conclusion as_ time passed that he was honestly misled.
We. f_elt that he was plunging ,further and further into
the morass, as one after another of the promised
.,
successes turned into failure.4
'
.
.
.Perhaps a much more simple explanation for the CourierJournal turn of opinion may be found in the change of ttle

I
2rbid., M"arch 13, 1967.
3·

.

"'·.

Ibid., M"ay 15, 1967,

4correspondence by Barry Bingham, Sr., to-author,
August 10, .1970,
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tone of the times.

In 1954, the United States looked upon

itself as the guardian of democracy worldwide.

That ·d,uty

included cont~ining Communism whether in Greece, Aust~ia,
.

or Indo-Cllina.

I

Under the leadership of John Foster Dul les
1

the'State Department sought to support "democracies"
throughout the world.

These included Guatemala, the Dominican
'

Republic, an~ South Vietnam.

The early fifties were days of

crusades against Conmunism both at home and abroad.
1954 the paper simply followed these trends,

In

As the

fifties progressed into the sixties these rtdemocracies"
which the United States had defended were revealed to be
not democratic at all but often dictatorships, in some cases
more oppressive than Conmunist regimes,
the press then softened on Communism.

The attitude of
This coupled with the

editorial staff 1 s conviction that America's position in
Vietnam was morally wrong and nationally debilitating,· .
.

served to turn the paper to opposition to the war.

'

This

opinion was reinforced by a similar turn of public sentiment
after a lag of about two years.

Perhaps the United States

and the Courier-Journal had learned that we cannot be the
· guardian of democracy, that democ,r<;1cy cannot be fostered
in.Asia~ that we cannot dictate other people's morals, that
we are not' all-knowing nor always right.

In this chang~ng
'

of 'the time_s may lie the main reason for the turn of thJ
Courier-Journal.

. ..

..
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This appendix contains charts noting both overal .
.. and monthly interest levels for ·courier-Journal VietnJ
opinion.

During 1956, 1957, and 1958 no Vietnam relatJd

editorials appeared.

.

l

For purposes of·this compilation~

editorial cartoons are counted a& one unit of comment.
I

Syndicated sources are also tabulated to provide contrJst
'

and comparison to•Courier-Journal interest levels.
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APPENDIX II
·This appendix contains samples of the work of staff
cartoonist Hugh Haynie.

Dates shown were selected to

show Haynie 1 s reaction ·to significant events in°Vietnam,
I

or certain periods of special interest •.

Plate i

May

Plate ii

October 9, 1963 - The Diem crisis

Plate iii

August 5, 1964 - The Gulf of Tonkin Affair

Plate iv

M"ay 2, 1967 - Criticism of.Johnson

Plate

April 26, 1967 - Escalation

V

Plate vi

15, 1962

The first Laos crisis

..

''
I

.. ,

September 10, 1967 - Peace
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THE EDITORIAL POLICY OF THE LOUISVILLE
COURIER-JOURNAL AS REGARDS VIETNAM"
'John A. Mitchell, M.A.
Morehead State University, 1973
Thesis Abstract
Director of Thesis:

Dr. W. Edmund Hicks

-The Louisville Courier-Journal changed its position

I

on Vietnam dramatically in .the fifteen years following ;the
'

French defeat by the Communist Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu
in 1954,

At the beginning of this period, in 1954,and

1955, the paper took an internationalist interventionist
stance.

Although it never advocated commitment of American

ground troops, the paper's editorial staff supported airstrike intervention and technical-logistical assistance: to
French anti-Communist efforts. ·After.the conclusion of._ a
negotiated settlement and a decline in the fighting in'
Inda-China; the paper t~rned its attention elsewhere and
maintained relative silence on Vietnam until 1961,
I

In the early sixties the Couri"er-Journal expresse~
.

'

concern about the widening war in Vietnam and the excesses
of the Ngo Dinh Diem government then in power,

rt never-

theless approved advisor increases instituted by President
Kennedy.

However, 1963.proved to be a pivotal year.

I-n
I

that year South Vietnamese President Diem was overthrown by
1

2
an anny coup, U.S. President Kenredy was assassinated and

the publishership of the Courier-Journal changed hands
from Mark .Ethridge to Barry Bingham.

By the mid-point of

the following year these three events had changed the tone
of the paper's Vietnam policy.

The paper detested the

unstable governments which followed in rapid succession in
Saigon and believed President Johnson's Vietnam policy in
error.
During the remaining years, 1964-1969, the CourierJournal widened its disapproval _and deepened its criticism
of Johnson and of the Saigo_n government.

By 1969 it had

transformed itself into an obvious critic of the Vietnam war.
In part, these changes were simply reflections of the
changing public viewpoint concerning involvement in Southeast Asia.

They also resulted from changes in the Courier-

Journal staff.

The addition of cartoonist Hugh Haynie in

1959 gave the paper its most effective and visible war critic
and the departure of Weldon Jame.s in 1966 removed the last
war supporter from the editorial staff.

The 1963 publisher

change removed _the strong anti-Communi s t Ethridge and brought
Bingham to powe r.

Changes in United States Vietnam policy

also helped stimulate the paper's shift.

While it• could

support increases in the number of advisors by President
Kennedy, the paper could not condone commitment of American
ground troops by President Johnson.
such a commitment.

It had always opposed

Neither could it approve Johnson's

bombing of North Vietnam.

3
Perhaps the largest factor in the paper•s shift las
.the changing nature of the war itself,

I

Always increasing in

size· and cost (both in money and in lives), the. war sekmed

I

endless.

.

It appeared a drain of the American way of life,

·a disruption of domestic and foreign affairs, and a blkmish
on the American image,

As such the paper se~med bound!to

oppose it,
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